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[T]he right of property... [is] that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.'
[It] consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [a person's]
acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of
the land. 2 - William Blackstone
The idea of property consists in an established expectation;.., an advan-
tage in the thing possessed.... Now this expectation... can only be the
work of law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard
as mine, except through the promise of the law which guarantees it to
me.... Property and law are born together, and die together.3
- Jeremy Bentham
INTRODUCTION
The familiar definitions of property quoted above contain the germs
of conflict: both declare the importance of individual desires and
choices, but also recognize that laws circumscribe the enjoyment of pri-
vate property. This tension between private and public demands some-
times may redefine the rights of property owners. The conflict is
particularly strong in the context of public lands management, where the
exercise of private rights may affect lands that serve a myriad of different
purposes for different members of the public. Law developed to reconcile
competing property rights in other settings may help resolve these con-
flicts. Similarly, lessons from public land law may alter more general
perceptions of property rights.
Although the term "public lands" suggests all lands owned by the
federal government, for the purposes of this Article it refers only to prop-
erty managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency of
1. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2.
2. 1 id. at * 134 (emphasis added).
3. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (R. Hildreth trans. 1864) (lst ed.
1802).
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the Department of the Interior.4 The 448 million acres of land under the
BLM's jurisdiction fulfill numerous demands for such things as wilder-
ness preservation, recreation, and commodity production.' The BLM
faces a difficult challenge in reconciling these competing demands, partic-
ularly when private development rights conflict with collective values,
such as environmental protection.
6
Because the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA),7 the BLM's organic statute, does not directly resolve disputes
between competing public and private demands, the BLM's task is even
more difficult.8 FLPMA does not require the BLM to devote any partic-
ular tract of public land to any specific use. Instead, the statute grants
the agency flexibility in allocating resources. 9 Nevertheless, FLPMA
broadly requires that the BLM, "in managing the public lands ... shall,
by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unneces-
sary or undue degradation of the lands."' 0 This command is the lodestar
by which the BLM is to judge the impacts of any specific proposal to use
public lands. It is not a precise guide. "
4. The statute governing the BLM defines "public lands" as those lands administered by
the BLM. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1988). Public lands managed by the BLM are located
primarily in the 1 contiguous western states and Alaska. Generally speaking they are federal
lands not reserved for specific purposes, in contrast to National Parks or National Forests.
About one-half of the BLM lands are in Alaska. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 162 (2d ed. 1987).
5. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 162; SENATE COMM. ON INTE-
RIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATURAL RESOURCE LANDS MANAGEMENT ACT, S. REP. No.
583, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 27-36 (1975).
6. Environmental values are collective because, although society views them as benefi-
cial, private property is rarely dedicated to their protection. Public lands may be particularly
suited to serving collective values. See Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or
Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283 (1982); Sax, The Legiti-
macy of Collective Values: The Case of the Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 537 (1985).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1784 (1988)).
8. To add to the disarray, the BLM administers specific resources under several other
statutes. See, e.g., Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (1988); Mineral Leasing Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988); Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1988); Taylor Grazing
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988).
9. See generally Mansfield, The "Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Re-
formed" Administrative Law and Proposal for Orderly Participation, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 465, 498-99 (1988) (noting the wide variety of potentially conflicting demands the BLM
must reconcile).
10. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
11. The statute further complicates the BLM's task by using two slightly different formu-
lations of the unnecessary or undue degradation standard without explanation. The command
to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation appears once in FLPMA § 302(b), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1732(b) (1988) (dealing with general land use), and again in FLPMA § 603(c), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1782(c) (1988) (prescribing standard of land management to be used while Congress is deter-




Implementing the unnecessary or undue degradation standard may
create conflicts between public and private interests. Congress' use of the
imperative "shall" creates a duty to moderate private as well as public
activity to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands.
The scope of the BLM's regulatory powers under this duty may be very
broad. FLPMA may authorize the BLM not only to refuse to grant a
private right or interest in the public land, but also to regulate any pri-
vate activities that impact public lands regardless of where such activity
is undertaken. Courts have held that the BLM may not completely for-
bid a private activity, 12 but they have not yet defined the full extent of the
BLM's power under FLPMA.
This Article examines the boundary between private and public
property rights by addressing the scope of the BLM's authority to pre-
vent unnecessary or undue degradation of public lands. The analysis fo-
cuses on the problems that can arise when a privately owned mineral
interest lies under a tract of public land. To make the discussion of the
BLM's dilemma more relevant to general property rights analysis, the
Article assumes that the private mineral interest was reserved when the
land was conveyed to the BLM. 13 The surface of the land, because it is
managed by the BLM, clearly falls within FLPMA's definition of public
land. 14 The private mineral right adjoins the public surface, but the min-
eral right is separately owned. Because the private interest did not arise
froma federal lease or a federal mining claim, no specialized rules govern
its development. 15
For this type of private interest, FLPMA's command to prevent un-
necessary or undue degradation is the only authority available to justify
the BLM's regulation of private development. Thus, how the BLM
chooses to interpret FLPMA's vague language can profoundly affect the
12. See Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1985) (BLM may not employ
standard to prohibit all off-road vehicle activity); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1088
(10th Cir. 1988) (BLM may not employ standard to deny exercise of vested property right).
13. Although most BLM land does not contain reserved mineral interests, the situation
does occur. See Ramex Mining Corp. v. Watt, 753 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
900 (1985).
14. Except for the Outer Continental Shelf and lands managed for indigenous peoples,
FLPMA defines public lands as "any land and interest in land... administered by the Secre-
tary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management, without regard to how the
United States acquired ownership." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1988); see Sierra Club v. Watt, 608
F. Supp. 305, 331-38 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (split estate lands, where the United States does not own
the subsurface mineral rights, are public lands).
15. This assumption eliminates a variety of issues. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Andrus,
614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980) (patent applicant with valid
mining claim has absolute right to patent; because government agency exercises no discretion
in granting patent, preparation of environmental impact statement pursuant to NEPA not
required). Isolating the mineral right from a federal grant removes contract doctrine from the
picture and also avoids the issue of a government taking of rights granted by contract. See
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Union Oil Co. of California v. Mor-
ton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1975).
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relationship between competing public and private interests that may af-
fect public lands. One option, here termed the "weak" interpretation of
the standard, is to concentrate on accommodating the private right while
minimizing degradation of public lands. This approach would limit the
BLM to fine-tuning the private activity while allowing the developer to
take all measures essential to the exercise of the private right.
A second option, the "strong" interpretation, would allow the BLM
to balance the private right against the land's other potential uses, which
includes serving collective environmental values. Under the strong inter-
pretation, the BLM could subordinate private objectives to the mainte-
nance of collective interests when the value of those interests dwarfs that
of the private endeavor. Use of the strong interpretation could, in places,
dramatically readjust the boundary between private and public rights.
To date, the BLM has consistently employed the weak interpreta-
tion of the unnecessary or undue degradation standard. Although this
stance is not unreasonable, FLPMA permits the stronger interpretation.
Drawing on the history of public land law, the nature of the Property
Power, and the importance of the collective values served by the public
lands, this Article argues that the BLM has the power to adopt the
strong interpretation, and should use that interpretation to preclude pri-
vate activity in appropriate circumstances. The Article finds support for
this argument in the law governing disputes between surface and mineral
estate owners, the public trust doctrine, and, to a limited extent, takings
jurisprudence.
Part I reviews the history of public lands management through
FLPMA's enactment. Part II analyzes regulatory and judicial interpre-
tations of FLPMA's unnecessary or undue degradation standard. Part
III considers the legal models that have evolved to reconcile disputes
between private owners of mineral and surface rights. Part IV argues for
adoption of the strong interpretation of the unnecessary or undue degra-
dation standard by examining the nature of the collective interests in-
volved and using the public trust doctrine as an interpretative aid. Part
V then considers how this enhanced regulatory authority might be imple-
mented. Finally, part VI briefly outlines the regulatory takings issues
implicated by the proposed changes in the interpretation of FLPMA's
management standard.
I
BACKGROUND: THE BLM AND ITS AUTHORITY
A. Evolution of the BLM: From Auctioneer to Manager
Public lands have a prominent place in the American mythology of
the frontier. They are where the deer, the antelope, and the cowboy
roam. They are where the wizened prospector led his mules in search of
1991]
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gold. Despite these rather vivid images, the BLM and its public lands,
unlike other federal lands, have failed to capture general public enthusi-
asm. The National Parks have come to be regarded as the crown jewels
of the nation's lands. Hunters and others concerned with wildlife sup-
port the primary purposes of National Wildlife Refuges. Despite a tim-
ber industry bias, the Forest Service has Smokey the Bear, who invites
families to picnic and camp in the National Forests. By contrast, the
BLM lacks an identifiable, sympathetic image. One explanation for this
void lies in the agency's historic emphasis on meeting the distinct needs
of resource-oriented industries.
The formal history of the BLM began when the General Land Office
merged with the Grazing Service in 1946.16 The General Land Office
had been responsible for disposal of lands and resources under various
homestead laws, state land grants, and mineral laws. 17 The Grazing Ser-
vice managed grazing districts under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,18
which was primarily designed to promote and stabilize the cattle indus-
try by providing access to forage. 19
The BLM inherited the older agencies' perspectives. The merged
agency often appeared to be only an instrument for giving private enter-
prise its rightful share of public resources. 20 This emphasis on moving
land and resources to private ownership reflected the original duties of
the Secretary of the Interior, which concentrated on the orderly and law-
ful transfer of public lands to private control.21 The General Land Office
adopted this land transfer mantle, but was not otherwise an aggressive or
effective long-term land manager.
16. Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 61-67 (1982).
17. In disposing of federally owned lands, the General Land Office did not always meet
congressional goals. Greene, Promised Land: A Contemporary Critique of Distribution of Pub-
lic Land by the United States, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 714-18 (1976).
18. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1988).
19. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 856-57 (E.D. Cal.
1985).
20. See Coggins, Evans & Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Manage-
ment I. The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 536-37 (1982) (tradi-
tional concern for provision of grazing land in tension with effective management).
21. 43 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Although no one could wrongfully exclude others from the
public lands, these newly private lands were to be developed. United States ex rel. Bergen v.
Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1988), aff'g 620 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Wyo. 1985); see Cam-
field v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522-26 (1897) (discussing right of occupiers of public land
to develop it); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-28 (1890) (defendants cannot be deprived of
right to graze cattle on uncultivated federal land); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc.,
611 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1980) (mining claimants can restrict public use where there is
active mining or prospecting). The Secretary's role was to assure compliance with the law and
to prevent assertion of invalid claims against these commonly held lands. Best v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460
(1920); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-82 (1891).
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Over time, the duties of the General Land Office and, later, the
BLM gradually expanded to include more than just the transfer of lands
from the public domain to private control.22 First, the General Land
Office began to dispense resources distinct from land. For example, the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 192023 gave the Secretary greater control
over the development of certain minerals by imposing a leasing system.
Under this law, the Secretary could protect public land values other than
mineral resources. 24 Additionally, the Taylor .Grazing Act, while envi-
sioning eventual disposal of public lands, allowed the Secretary to trans-
fer rights to use the forage resource without transferring the lands.
25
Later statutes, enacted subsequent to the BLM's formation, further ex-
panded the agency's duties. The Multiple Use Mining Act of 195526 and
the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 196427 directed the agency to
manage and classify lands for different purposes.
28
As a changing population placed new recreational and aesthetic de-
mands on the public lands, however, it became apparent that the BLM's
mandate needed fundamental, not piecemeal, revision.29 Congress en-
22. For a summary of the statutory history of the Interior Department's duties with re-
spect to the public lands, see Coggins, The Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary
on the Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983).
23. Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-217
(1988)). One of the purposes of this Act was to prevent overproduction of mineral resources.
Leasing replaced patenting for fuel minerals (oil, gas, oil shale, coal, native asphalt, and bitu-
minous rock) and fertilizer and chemical minerals (phosphate, potash, and sodium). See gen-
erally Mansfield, Through the Forest of the Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Controversy Toward a
Paradigm of Meaningful NEPA Compliance, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 85, 90-98 (1989)
(analyzing leasing as method of governmental control of development of oil and gas resources);
Comment, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act, and
the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of a Resolution, 12 ENVTL. L. 363, 367-84
(1982) (describing development of leasing system for disposal of surface and subsurface re-
sources to private entrepreneurs and the extent of the BLM's discretionary authority in mak-
ing leasing decisions).
24. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 480-83 (1963).
25. Ch. 865, §§ 5-6, 48 Stat. 1269, 1271-72 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315d-315e (1988)).
Under the Act, the federal government was to manage grazing districts "pending ... final
disposal," which indicates that the lands were to be eventually transferred. 43 U.S.C. § 315
(1988).
26. Ch. 375, 69 Stat. 368 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1988)); see infra
notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
27. Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 988 (1964) (expired 1970).
28. For the "conventional" wisdom that "multiple use" provides an ineffectual standard,
see Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach to Forest Land
Management, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 473 (1967); Comment, Managing Federal Lands: Replac-
ing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787, 788 (1973). But see Coggins, Of Succotash
Syndrome and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustainable Yield"for Pub-
lic Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229, 243-50 (1981); Marsh & Sherwood, Meta-
morphosis in Mining Law: Federal Legislative and Regulatory Amendment and
Supplementation of the General Mining Law Since 1955, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 209,
247-50 (1980).
29. See Clawson, The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 in a Broad His-
torical Perspective, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 585, 595 (1979) (FLPMA's origins found in demo-
19911
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acted FLPMA in 1976 in response to this need. 30 Grazing and mineral
functions remain strong elements of the agency's role under the new stat-
ute. 31 For the first time, however, FLPMA requires the BLM to do what
its name implies: manage land.32 FLPMA's enumerated policies show
the importance of planning and management as central functions of the
BLM.
3 3
FLPMA forces the BLM to consider disparate values, but does not
demand a particular result. In crafting FLPMA, Congress did not adopt
the advice of the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC). 34
The PLLRC recommended that the BLM undertake comprehensive
planning, with Congress providing a clear set of goals. Certain lands
would be devoted to primary uses. In cases of conflict, the BLM would
follow priorities specified by Congress. 35 By contrast, the planning pro-
graphic, economic, social, and political trends). For criticisms identifying past and present
problems such as underfunding, political pressure, and conflicting demands placed on the
BLM, see Coggins, Evans & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 20, at 564; Fairfax, Old Recipes for
New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 973 (1982).
30. Clawson, supra note 29, at 595-96.
31. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 315j, 1751-1753 (1988) (grazing management); id.
§ 1701(a)(12) (policy includes management to promote food and mineral production); id.
§ 1702() (major or principal uses include domestic livestock grazing and mineral exploration
and production); see Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (D. Nev. 1989) (primary
intent of grazing statutes is to protect livestock); Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1988).
32. FLPMA made some management duties mandatory. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 869 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (BLM may not abdicate
responsibility to set terms in grazing permits). Nevertheless, FLPMA reestablished the previ-
ously criticized goals of multiple use and sustained yield as guiding concepts. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1732(a) (1988). According to Professor Coggins, these concepts have become more than
platitudes within the context of FLPMA: "Inherent in the concept are detailed and compre-
hensive commands to force thinking before acting and to mold individual actions into a long-
range scheme for the public benefit. FLPMA does not allow the manager to do whatever
appears politic or expedient at the time." Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management
IV- FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 65 (1984). For an argu-
ment that "dominant use management" (management of individual tracts for specialized pro-
duction rather than mixed use) might better achieve the goal of serving disparate uses, see
Daniels, Rethinking Dominant Use Management in the Forest-Planning Era, 17 ENVTL. L. 483
(1987).
33. "[T]he public lands [should] be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of
the land use planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal of a
particular parcel will serve the national interest .. " 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1988); see Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3183 (1990) (FLPMA established "a policy in
favor of retaining public lands for multiple use management").
34. The PLLRC was established pursuant to Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986 (1964)
(expired 1970), and advised both Congress and the President. Its main publication was ONE
THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS
(1970) [hereinafter ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND].
35. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, supra note 34, at 45-48. The PLLRC sug-
gested a nonexhaustive list of value preferences to Congress. Under this scheme, Congress
could have directed the BLM to favor regional economic growth or values that do not have a
market price, or could have required that the BLM adopt the option that was least harmful to
the environment.
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cedure adopted in FLPMA simply requires the BLM to "consider" both
present and future uses of the public lands36 as well as the relative scar-
city of their valuable attributes. 37 FLPMA also requires "a systematic
interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physi-
cal, biological, economic, and other sciences."' 38 These duties, however,
are procedural requirements, not substantive guidelines. 39 Moreover,
when it does provide policy guidance, FLPMA articulates the mutually
exclusive goals of environmental protection on the one hand, 4° and en-
hancement of production on the other.41 Other sections of FLPMA,
such as those dealing with land and resource dispositions, similarly con-
tain laundry lists of policy considerations, many of which are open to
discretionary interpretation.4 2
The result of a compromise between forces battling for control of
the public lands, 43 FLPMA reflects the concerns of many groups, in-
cluding environmentalists, miners, and ranchers. It therefore appears
"internally inconsistent."' 44 The apparent conflicts between the disparate
policy goals can largely be resolved by considering the public lands as a
whole. Some lands might best serve one goal, while others could more
effectively be used to achieve another. In this way, all of the purposes
specified by Congress could be served on some portion of the public
lands.45
Congress did not direct the BLM to consistently favor either re-
source use or land preservation. Nor did it provide the BLM with a clear
standard to employ in choosing among these interests when they con-
flict.4 6 Unlike statutes imposing rigid substantive restrictions 47 or pro-
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(5) (1988).
37. Id. § 1712(c)(6).
38. Id. § 1712(c)(2).
39. Procedural controls are not without value. They can influence decisions and improve
awareness of environmental concerns. See Mansfield, supra note 9, at 495, 505.
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988).
41. Id. § 1701(a)(12).
42. See id. § 1713(a) (sales allowed when disposal "will serve important public objectives
which outweigh other public objectives and values, including.. . recreation and scenic
values"); id. § 1716(a) (exchanges must be in the public interest and BLM in so determining
must consider "better Federal land management and the needs of State and local people, in-
cluding needs for lands for the economy, community expansion, recreation areas, food, fiber,
minerals, and fish and wildlife"); id. § 1719(b) (government may convey reserved mineral in-
terests when "reservation of mineral rights in the United States is interfering with or preclud-
ing appropriate nonmineral development of the land and that such development is a more
beneficial use of the land than mineral development") (emphasis added).
43. See Clawson, supra note 29, at 595-96.
44. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979).
45. See id. at 1003 ("Some lands can be preserved, while others, more appropriately, can
be mined."). This case shows how courts ignore FLPMA's proviso that its policies are not
binding in the absence of statutory enactment. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1988). Courts tend to
view the policies as binding. See Coggins, supra note 32, at 10.
46. Mansfield, supra note 9, at 490-95.
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viding specific direction for resolving conflicts, 48 FLPMA allows the
agency to choose from a variety of permissible results. Nonetheless, a
spirit of environmental protection infuses FLPMA.49 Moreover,
FLPMA specifically requires that the BLM, in "managing the public
lands," take all action necessary to prevent "unnecessary or undue degra-
dation."' 50 These features of FLPMA may authorize the BLM to limit
private resource exploitation under proper circumstances.
B. Scope of the Property Power
The BLM's regulatory authority over the public lands ultimately de-
rives from the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives
Congress the authority to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States."' 51 This clause gives Congress broad discretion to set
terms for the use and disposition of public property, 52 and allows Con-
47. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988), is one
example of such a statute. The Supreme Court has held that the ESA requires protection of
species threatened with extinction, and that courts have no discretion to soften the statute's
impacts. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978).
48. Other statutes have been interpreted as substantive, but without the rigidity of the
ESA. For example, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act requires the managing agency to adminis-
ter a designated river "to protect and enhance the values which caused it to be included in [the
Wild and Scenic River] system without, insofar as consistent therewith, limiting other uses
that do not substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of these values." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1281(a) (1988). The values that make a river wild and scenic are paramount, but because
interference with these protected values must be "substantial" before an activity is forbidden,
the agency retains some discretion. Wilderness Soc'y v. Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-79
(E.D. Cal. 1988). Several other acts allow some agency discretion within a protective frame-
work. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1422 n.4 (9th Cir.
1989) (Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area Act); Izaak Walton League v. St. Claire, 497
F.2d 849, 852-53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (Wilderness Act); Comment, A
Question of Balance: The National Forest Management Act and Draft Forest Plans in the
Northern Region, 6 Pun. LAND L. REV. 141, 149-52 (1985).
49. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 857-61 (E.D.
Cal. 1985); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For commentators emphasizing
FLPMA's environmental mandate, see, for example, Coggins, supra note 32, at 14, 26-32 (pro-
tection of environmental values one of FLPMA's major themes); Hagenstein, Public Lands
and Environmental Concerns, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 449, 451 (1979) (FLPMA "provides a strong
mandate for considering environmental values in future public land decisions"). For the con-
trary view, see Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 28, at 261-72 (Congress required that public
lands be used to achieve mineral independence); Peck, "And Then There Were None"- Evolv-
ing Federal Restraints on the Availability of Public Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-2, 3-14 (1979) (limiting development violates congressional statutes and
policies).
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988); see id. § 1782(c).
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
52. The United States wields not only the power of a proprietor but also that of a sover-
eign. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Comment, supra note 23,
at 399. But see Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REV.
283, 296 (1976) (arguing that the Jurisdiction Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17) grants
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gress to enact regulations beyond the scope of its other enumerated pow-
ers53 in order to protect public lands. 54 The Property Clause does not
explicitly grant the federal government any power over private interests,
whether or not those interests may affect public lands. Nonetheless, pri-
vate activities may become subject to federal regulation under the Prop-
erty Clause in two ways.
First, in order to carry out their desired activities, private parties
may need supplemental property grants from the federal government.
Because these grants would fall within the BLM's traditional power to
control disposal of public lands, the BLM may have the authority to reg-
ulate these private activities by conditioning the supplemental grants to
protect the public lands. 55 For example, if a private owner of mineral
rights needed a right-of-way across public lands to reach a mineral de-
posit, the BLM could use that need to regulate the private activity. In
setting the terms of an access grant, the BLM could consider the impacts
mining would have on the public lands.56 Impacts judged to be too se-
vere could arguably justify complete denial of access. 57 Even if access
sovereign powers only over federal enclaves). For criticisms of Engdahl's view, see Sullivan,
The Power of Congress under the Property Clause: A Potential Check on the Effect of the
Chadha Decision on Public Land Legislation, 6 PuB. LAND L. REV. 65, 82 (1985); Wilkinson,
The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 Pun. LAND
L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1980) (Engdahl's model of sovereignty may have been original intent, but was
never implemented by courts). See also Coggins, Evans & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 20, at
577-88; Cowart & Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and Administrative Real-
ity, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375, 441-50 (1988).
53. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (Property Clause "analogous to
the police power of the several states").
54. United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989); cf Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (U.S. may authorize killing of deer on
federal land when those deer are endangering the land, irrespective of a particular state's hunt-
ing laws).
55. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REV. 157, 166 (1981). The power to
impose conditions usually operates when the private right is initially granted, and might there-
fore not apply directly to a reserved mineral estate. Cf. Gould, Public Trust Doctrine and
Water Rights, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-19 (1988) (grantee who receives prop-
erty subject to traditional public trust duties must accept the possibility of regulation).
56. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
822 (1980); see also Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 28, at 257 ("Any mining operation on the
public lands of sufficient scope to have a 'significant' effect on the human environment will
inevitably involve some sort of discretionary federal action."); Noble, Environmental Regula-
tion of Hardrock Mining on Public Lands: Bringing the 1872 Law Up to Date, 4 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 145, 158-60 (1980) (BLM may act to block mining ventures not in public
interest by denying rights-of-way and additional land; this discretion exists even if venture
plans satisfy federal mining laws).
57. Statutory access rights might preclude denial of access for some inholdings or rights
under the Mining Law. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988); 16 U.S.C. § 3210 (1988). See gener-
ally Martz, Love & Kaiser, Access to Mineral Interests by Right. Permit, Condemnation, or
Purchase, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1075 (1988); Quarles & Lundquist, You Can Get
There From Here: The Alaska Lands Act's Innovations in the Law of Access Across Federal
Lands, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 347 (1987).
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were granted, that grant could be, and under FLPMA would have to be,
conditioned to protect the environment.5 8
Second, private activities may harm the public lands, directly or in-
directly. The Property Clause, if read broadly, would give the BLM the
power to prevent this harm. Courts have long approved the use of the
property power to prevent harm to federal lands from activities under-
taken on private lands. For example, one early case upheld a federal
conviction for causing a fire that threatened federal land, although the
fire began on private land.59 Another affirmed the conviction of an indi-
vidual who had erected fences on private land, preventing access to pub-
lic land.6°
The courts have also extended the concept of "harm" to include
congressional policy as well as the physical integrity of the public lands. 61
As one recent decision stated, "[u]nder this authority to protect public
land, Congress' power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the
public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal
land." 62
Most of the cases affirming federal power to regulate activities oc-
curring on private land have dealt with inholdings, private interests that
are within the geographic boundary of a public reserve. 63 The federal
58. FLPMA subch. V, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1988); see Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F.
Supp. 904, 915-16 (D. Wyo. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Texaco Producing, Inc. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d
776 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that the discretion to grant includes the ability to condition the
grant).
59. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) ("Congress may prohibit the doing
of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil publicly owned forests."). Complete refusal to
allow beneficial use of private inholdings on the grounds of preventing damage to public lands
might be beyond the BLM's authority. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911). The
Curtin court, however, emphasized the lack of proof that the private use at issue would cause
any damage to the public land. Id. at 85.
60. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
61. Id. at 527; see McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) (protecting con-
gressional policy of free passage over public lands); Robbins v. United States, 284 F. 39, 46
(8th Cir. 1922) (protecting congressional control of highways in national parks). Camfield has
been read as allowing the BLM to preclude activities that would frustrate federal policy, even
if they are not otherwise objectionable. See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Gaetke, supra note 55, at 169-74. But see Leo Sheep
Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 685 (1979) (referring to Camfield as a nuisance case).
62. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d at 1249; see Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks
and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 250-55 (1976). But see United
States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137, 143-44 (E.D. Va. 1979) (no public nuisance in high-
rise construction that would visually intrude on Washington's "monumental core," so no fed-
eral power to regulate).
63. For additional cases upholding federal regulation of conduct on nonfederal land
when reasonably necessary to protect federal lands, see United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); Free Enterprise Canoe Renters v. Watt, 711
F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (federal government has power to regulate riverbed
owned by state within National Park boundaries); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977) (federal government may regulate lake within National
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government, therefore, almost certainly can regulate activities under-
taken on private land surrounded by public land when those activities
directly interfere with the management of public resources. 64 Although
it is not clear how far the Property Power extends beyond the borders of
public property, 65 regulation of inholdings to prevent conflicts with con-
gressionally declared purposes appears permissible. 66
Further, if the plenary67 nature of the Property Power is taken liter-
ally, the BLM's protective arm could potentially extend to any activity
that even theoretically could affect the public lands. This interpretation
would go beyond the decisions to date, taking the Property Power far
beyond the public reserve. The BLM is not likely to assert such far-
reaching power, nor should it. Only a direct and immediate causal link
between a private activity and the BLM's mission to manage public lands
for designated purposes should trigger regulation.68
Thus, the constitutional scope and politically achievable reach of the
BLM's authority remain somewhat unclear. The BLM might not be au-
thorized to act to prevent harm threatened to the public lands by activity
on private lands that are not inholdings. Nonetheless, because the Prop-
erty Clause encourages protection of public lands, 69 the BLM should in-
terpret FLPMA's directive to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation
of the public lands to include the power to restrict activities beneath pub-
Park despite state claim to ownership of lake); Wilkenson v. Department of the Interior, 634 F.
Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Colo. 1986).
64. See Holt, Property Clause Regulation Off Federal Lands: An Analysis, and Possible
Application to Indian Treaty Rights, 19 ENVTL. L. 295, 303-08 (1988); Wilkinson, supra note
52, at 12-15. But see Rohlf & Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal Frame-
work of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 273-75 (1988) (unclear if Wilderness
Act requires agency to control surrounding areas).
65. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546-47 (1976) (leaving question open).
66. See supra note 63; see also Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National
Parks from External Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1987) (describing Na-
tional Park Service powers over inholdings); Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the
Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
923, 952 (1989) (Forest Service hesitates to use its powers over inholdings).
67. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539-40 (Congress has "complete" power over property entrusted
to it).
68. The Interior Board of Land Appeals had a lively debate on whether the BLM had a
"roving mandate to do good" when setting coal lease terms. The contested term required the
lessee to avoid damaging timber and forage on private lands and to repair damage if practical.
The majority of the Board refused to enforce it, holding that specific regulation of actions on
private property should be limited to two situations: 1) protection of associated federal prop-
erty; or 2) implementation of broad environmental goals required by specific statutes. Two
vigorous dissents found the lease terms appropriate because they controlled actions related to
the subject matter of the lease and those actions could impact federal resources. Blackhawk
Coal Co., 68 Interior Bd. Land App. 96 (1982). For commentators also acknowledging that
regulatory power under the Property Clause is not likely to be stretched to extremes, see
Fairfax, supra note 29, 973-78; Wilkinson, supra note 52, at 12-15.
69. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 538 (statutes with protective intent may properly affect pri-
vate property under Property Clause); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.
1988) (Property Clause designed to protect public lands from injury and trespass).
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lic lands, on lands surrounded by public lands, and also on lands adjoin-
ing public lands. The BLM could possibly regulate activity on private
lands which are not directly adjacent, but they should do so only in cases
of extreme conflict.70
II
INTERPRETATION OF THE "UNNECESSARY OR UNDUE
DEGRADATION" STANDARD UNDER FLPMA
FLPMA provides two management standards for the BLM. One,
which governs all BLM-managed lands, requires the BLM to "take any
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
[public] lands."'7 ' The second standard, applicable only to Wilderness
Study Areas (WSA's), uses a two-pronged analysis. WSA's were created
to satisfy section 603 of FLPMA, which directs the BLM to ascertain
which of its lands have the attributes of wilderness and to recommend to
Congress areas appropriate for wilderness preservation.72 In managing
WSA's pending congressional action, the BLM must first act "in a man-
ner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness."'7 3 This aspect of WSA management is known as the nonim-
pairment standard. Certain preexisting uses and valid existing rights
within WSA's are not limited by the nonimpairment standard.74 With
respect to these activities, the BLM is to "take any action required to
70. The term "adjacent" cannot be precisely defined. See Solicitor's Opinion, Interpreta-
tion of Section 603 of Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: The Bureau of Land
Management Wilderness Study (M-36910), 86 Interior Dec. 89, 112 n.56 (1979) [hereinafter
Solicitor I] (rule of reason and site-specific characteristics determine if activity is "adjacent" to
Wilderness Study Area). But see Coggins, supra note 66, at 3 n.10 ("While 'adjacent' is
broader than 'adjoining,' as the former includes 'close to,' and while 'fairly close proximity' is
scarcely definitive, those three descriptive phrases in combination should adequately define the
relevant area.").
71. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
72. Id. § 1782. Although the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988),
required the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chief of the Forest Service, and the Secretary of the
Interior to review their landholdings and determine which areas were appropriate for wilder-
ness preservation, it did not direct the BLM to inventory or manage its lands for wilderness.
Id. § 1132. A "wilderness" is "an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval
character and influence .... which... generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature." Id. § 1131(c).
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1988).
74. Id. This section provides that
the Secretary shall continue to manage . . . lands [under review] according to his
authority under this Act and other applicable law in a manner so as not to impair the
suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, however, to the con-
tinuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in the same manner
and degree in which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976: Provided,
that in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or otherwise take
any action to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their re-
sources or to afford environmental protection.
Additionally, all BLM actions under FLPMA are "subject to valid existing rights." FLPMA
§ 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1988).
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prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their re-
sources or to afford environmental protection. 7 5
This second prong of the WSA management provision is similar to
the general unnecessary or undue degradation standard.76 The general
standard does not, however, refer to action necessary to prevent degrada-
tion of the lands' "resources or to afford environmental protection." It is
not clear whether Congress intended this additional wording in the WSA
standard to require something not required by the general standard, or
whether Congress intended the same management scheme to apply but
inadvertently chose different language in the two provisions. The legisla-
tive history does not suggest a congressional intention to create different
standards.77 While acknowledging that the difference in wording could
arguably give the BLM greater regulatory authority within WSA's, this
Article presumes that the standards are identical.
A. Threshold: Nonimpairment Differs from Unnecessary
or Undue Degradation
The presence of two management standards in the portion of
FLPMA governing WSA's suggests that the two impose different du-
ties.78 During the review process, the BLM must manage these lands so
as either to maintain their suitability for preservation as wilderness or to
prevent "unnecessary or undue degradation. ' 79 Specifically, the BLM
must prohibit impairment of an area's wilderness suitability "subject...
to the continuation of existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leas-
ing"80 and "subject to valid existing rights." 8' At the same time, the
BLM retains authority under the second management level to regulate
all activity, including valid existing rights and grandfathered uses, to pre-
vent unnecessary or undue degradation.8 2
Congress apparently did not want to preclude all use of the public
lands during the WSA review process. 83 First, activities that do not cross
75. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1988).
76. The WSA provision refers to actions "required" to prevent degradation; the general
BLM mandate refers to actions "necessary" to prevent degradation. Compare id. § 1782(c)
with id. § 1732(b). This distinction is insignificant.
77. The House Report indicated that the Secretary, in managing WSA's, was to "con-
tinue to have authority to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation." H.R. REP. No. 1163,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976). Use of the word "continue" indicates conformity with previ-
ously granted duthority. See id. at 6 (discussing general management pursuant to section
202(f)(1) of H.R. 13777).
78. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1085 (10th Cir. 1988); Rocky Mountain Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 749 (10th Cir. 1982); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995,
1004 (D. Utah 1979).
79. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1988).
80. Id.
81. FLPMA § 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1988).
82. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1086 (10th Cir. 1988).
83. See S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The wording of the provision
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the impairment threshold may proceed. 84 More importantly, although
the BLM begins by analyzing all activity under the nonimpairment stan-
dard, 85 the expressly grandfathered uses and other valid existing rights
are not limited by this standard if such rights could not be exercised
under the standard. 86 Therefore, some activities that appear contrary to
wilderness preservation can take place so long as they do not unnecessa-
rily or unduly degrade the area.
If activities are neither grandfathered uses nor required for the exer-
cise of valid existing rights, however, the nonimpairment standard gov-
erns. The BLM must forbid these activities if they would impair the
suitability of the area for wilderness preservation. Generally, evaluating
activities requires a case-by-case analysis, but some activities are pre-
sumptively incompatible with wilderness suitability. For instance, road
building is not allowed in WSA's because, by definition, a wilderness con-
tains no roads. 87 Some would also consider mining8 8 and logging89 nec-
essarily violative of wilderness character.
discussed in this report differed from that ultimately enacted; it provided that review "shall not
of itself either change or prevent change in the management or use" of lands. S. 507, § 102(a),
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Therefore, this part of the legislative history, while informative,
is not conclusive evidence on the meaning of the enacted statute. See Short, Wilderness Poli-
cies and Mineral Potential on the Public Lands, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 39, 41 (1980)
(arguing that preclusion of activity during WSA inventory is contrary to FLPMA).
84. Solicitor I, supra note 70, at 99; Committee for Idaho's High Desert, 108 Interior Bd.
Land App. 277, 278 (1989).
85. The BLM first sees if existing rights could be exercised in a manner that would not
impair the area's suitability for wilderness before resorting to the unnecessary or undue degra-
dation standard. Solicitor's Opinion, The Bureau of Land Management Wilderness Review
and Valid Existing Rights (M-36910, Supp. 1981) 88 Interior Dec. 909, 914 (1981) [hereinafter
Solicitor II].
86. Existing rights, defined as both those actually being used or those authorized at the
time of FLPMA's passage, are not subject to the nonimpairment standard. Sierra Club v.
Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1988); see Solicitor II, supra note 85, at 913-15;
Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Land Under Wilderness Review, 44 Fed. Reg.
72,014 (1979) [hereinafter IMP]; Interim Management Policy and Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg.
31,854 (1983) [hereinafter Revised IMP]. The IMP and Revised IMP, as the BLM's interpre-
tation of its duty, provide standardized guidance. For earlier interpretations of the scope of
the grandfather clause, see Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 750 (10th
Cir. 1982) (upholding prior Interior interpretation in Solicitor I); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F.
Supp. 995, 1006 (D. Utah 1979) ("existing uses being carried out in the same manner and
degree" refers to "actual uses, not merely a statutory right to use").
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1988); see Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1085 (right-of-way uses can-
not be grandfathered in WSA's because such areas are roadless by definition).
88. See Izaak Walton League v. St. Claire, 353 F. Supp. 698, 715 (D. Minn. 1973) ("Min-
eral development.., by its very definition cannot take place in a wilderness area."), rev'd, 497
F.2d 849 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (agency must determine what impact
mining will have on wilderness). But see Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak
Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (mining exploration allowed to
proceed in WSA); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 333 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (Wilderness
Act expressly allows for the preservation of mining claims in wilderness areas); Mansfield,
supra note 23, at 110-13 (concrete facts must govern).
89. See Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593, 601 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d
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The BLM has introduced some flexibility to the nonimpairment
management directive. For example, the BLM allows activities to pro-
ceed even if they will temporarily impair an area's suitability for wilder-
ness, provided their impacts can later be substantially eradicated.90
Despite this flexibility, the activities allowable under the nonimpairment
provision must differ from those allowable under the unnecessary or un-
due degradation standard or Congress would not have employed differ-
ent language. 91 One interpretation of the difference is that the
nonimpairment standard requires stricter control than prevention of un-
necessary or undue degradation. 92 Management for nonimpairment does
permit the BLM to reject proposed activities that might not violate the
unnecessary or undue degradation standard.93 The conclusion that the
unnecessary degradation standard was less strict than the nonimpairment
directive led courts and the BLM to a second postulate: if the BLM must
use the less rigid standard, as in the case of valid existing rights or
grandfathered uses, it cannot prevent the exercise of those private
rights.94 The BLM's actions, however, need not be more limited under
the unnecessary degradation standard. In fact, the opposite may be true:
in assessing improper degradation, the BLM may have broader manage-
ment authority because it can consider impacts to resources other than
wilderness. 95
793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nor. Kaibab Industries v. Parker, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
90. See IMP, supra note 86, at 72,018; Revised IMP, supra note 86, at 31,856 (requiring
reclamation by the time the Secretary of the Interior is required to make a recommendation
regarding wilderness status for that area to the President; Secretary is currently required to
make these recommendations by October 21, 1991 (43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988))); see Sierra
Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1985) ("substantially unnoticeable" may refer
to area in total, not specific site); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1007 (allowing temporary
impairment "consistent with Congress' attempt to balance competing interests"). See gener-
ally Hall, Mineral Exploration and Development in Bureau of Land Management Wilderness
Study Areas, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 351, 370-71 (1979) (temporary impacts definition allows new
mineral activity in WSA's).
91. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1005 ("[I]f Congress had not intended to mandate
two standards, it would merely have indicated that the Secretary was to continue to manage all
lands so as to prevent unnecessary degradation."); see id. at 1005 n.14.; Ralph E. Pray, 105
Interior Bd. Land App. 44, 48 (1988) (BLM must reconsider if its approval was made under
wrong standard).
92. The Utah v. Andrus court took this position:
The word 'impair' would prevent many activities that would not be prevented by the
language of 'unnecessary or undue degradation.' For example, commercial timber
harvesting, if conducted carefully, would not result in unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the environment. But the same activity might well impair wilderness charac-
teristics as [defined in the Wilderness Act].
486 F. Supp. at 1005 (citations and footnotes omitted).
93. Id.
94. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1988) (BLM must allow
exercise of right-of-way); Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1009-10 (BLM may not forbid access
to state land grants).
95. The Interior Solicitor's analysis of the BLM's ability to regulate a miner who was
using explosives on the date of FLPMA's enactment illustrates this view. According to the
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B Administrative Interpretation of Unnecessary or Undue Degradation
The BLM has addressed the meaning of unnecessary or undue deg-
radation most extensively in two regulatory contexts. First, as discussed
above, the regulations and Interim Management Plans governing WSA's
indicated that the standard does not authorize the BLM to regulate ex-
isting uses and rights to the point that they become unexercisable. 96 Sec-
ond, the BLM has interpreted the unnecessary or undue degradation
standard in managing the surface impacts of mining activities undertaken
on unpatented mining claims.97 Placing these mining regulations in a
historical perspective may illuminate the BLM's view of the scope of its
power under the FLPMA management standard.
Prior to FLPMA's passage, the government exerted little control
over mining activities on the public lands. Under the Mining Law of
1872, these lands were simply open to persons exploring for minerals.98
If a private party discovered a "valuable mineral deposit," a claim could
be located and worked without further ado; the claimant could also
choose to seek a "patent," or fee simple title.99 Mining required no ap-
proval or authorization from the BLM.1°o
FLPMA was a compromise between those who desired to com-
pletely revamp the Mining Law and those who did not.' 0 Although
FLPMA left much of the earlier mining law intact, 0 2 it did make a sig-
Interior Solicitor, the BLM could not regulate the operation to preserve wilderness suitability
because FLPMA allowed existing uses to continue in the same "manner and degree." How-
ever, if the blasting caused unnecessary degradation, it could be stopped. Solicitor I, supra
note 70, at 119. But see id. at 121 n.82 (nonimpairment is "at least theoretically more strict").
96. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. BLM regulations defining trespass
treat the unnecessary or undue degradation standard similarly. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 2800.0-5(w),
2800.0-5(x), 2881.3, 9230, 9260 (1989).
97. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802, 3809 (1989).
98. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988); see United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277,
1281 (9th Cir. 1980). Mining activities could be controlled only by "withdrawing" lands from
the reach of this statute. See Getches, Managing the Public Lands.: The Authority of the Exec-
utive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279 (1982).
99. 30 U.S.C. §§ 29, 35-38 (1988).
100. See generally Kimball, Impact of BLM Surface Management Regulations on Explora-
tion and Mining Operations, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 509, 510-12 (1983) (providing
background discussion of the Mining Law of 1872). For arguments in favor of not requiring
any government grant or permission prior to mining and simply allowing individuals to initiate
mining, see Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 28, at 309-10; Mock, Mining Law Trends, 54 DEN.
L.J. 567, 576-78 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Clark, The Mining Law: PLLRC Recommendations - What Happened to
Them?, 54 DEN. L.J. 551, 562-66 (1977).
102. FLPMA expressly stated that it did not, for the most part, change the existing law
with respect to mining claims:
Except as provided in [certain listed sections] and the last sentence of this paragraph,
no provision of this section or any other section of this Act shall in any way amend
the Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of any locators or claims under that
Act, including, but not limited to, rights of ingress and egress.
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
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nificant change by including mining operations within the scope of the
BLM's duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the public
lands. 10 3
In implementing this change, the BLM promulgated two sets of reg-
ulations applicable to mining operations, one for claims located inside
WSA's 4 and one for claims found on other public lands.'05 The two
sets of regulations have some similarities because they address the same
activity. However, they differ in some respects because of the manage-
ment authorities and priorities that govern WSA's. This discussion con-
centrates on the treatment of unnecessary or undue degradation by the
two sets of regulations.1°6
The BLM's first draft regulations for the wilderness review program
and general mining claim regulation 0 7 did not directly define unneces-
sary and undue degradation. 08 The proposed regulations prompted vo-
luminous and vocal reaction,l ° 9 however, and the BLM retreated to the
accommodation principle in fashioning the final regulations.110 While
these rules allow the BLM to place some increased burden on the miner,
mining may not be precluded."' No court has yet considered whether
103. Id. FLPMA thus directly authorized regulation of mining activities, mooting the
debate over whether the Mining Law had authorized such regulation. Compare Bales v. Ruch,
522 F. Supp. 150, 154 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (Mining Law authorized regulation) with Miller, Sur-
face Use Rights Under the General Mining Law: Good Faith and Common Sense, 28 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 761, 789-90 (1988) (Mining Law did not by itself authorize regulation).
104. 43 C.F.R. § 3802 (1989).
105. Id. § 3809.
106. For differences in the definition of this standard in the two sets of regulations, see
infra note 110.
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 53,428 (1976).
108. 44 Fed. Reg. 2623-29 (1979).
109. 45 Fed. Reg. 78,902 (1980); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 13,956, 13968 (1980) (second set of
draft regulations promulgated).
110. See infra notes 152-55, 165-76 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion
of the accommodation principle. The regulations applicable outside WSA's most clearly illus-
trate this principle because they note that what constitutes unnecessary or undue degradation
may vary based on what other resources are impacted:
'Unnecessary or undue degradation' means surface disturbance greater than what
would normally result when an activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator
in usual, customary, and proficient operations of similar character and taking into
consideration the effects of operation on other resources and land uses, including those
resources and land uses outside the area of operations. Failure to initiate and com-
plete reasonable mitigation measures, including reclamation of disturbed areas, or
creation of a nuisance may constitute unnecessary or undue degradation.
43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1989) (emphasis added). The regulations applicable to claims located
within a WSA simply define unnecessary or undue degradation as "impacts greater than those
that would normally be expected from an activity being accomplished in compliance with
current standards and regulations and based on sound practices, including use of the best
reasonably available technology." 43 C.F.R. § 3802.0-5(/) (1989). Under this formulation, the
best reasonable methods of proceeding would always be required, without individual appraisal
of damage to other resources. Perhaps in defining this standard the BLM deemed all lands in
WSA's to be equally deserving of protection.
111. The rules state that they are designed not to "unduly hinder" mining. 43 C.F.R.
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the BLM correctly gauged the scope of its authority in developing these
regulations. 1 12
Earlier regulatory actions dealing with mining, however, may pro-
vide insight into the BLM's ability to issue regulations that might pre-
clude private development. First, the Multiple Use Mining Act of
19551 13 expressly changed the regulatory climate for mining on the pub-
lic lands. It gave the BLM authority to manage nonmineral resources
within the boundaries of unpatented mining claims. 14 Although the Act
did not change the primary purpose of these claims, it ended the claim-
ants' exclusive right of possession. " 5 Moreover, miners now clearly had
to employ reasonable means of production. Unreasonable mining meth-
ods would unnecessarily destroy surface resources, a result which would
conflict with the BLM's directive to manage those resources. 16 Under
the Multiple Use Mining Act, mining on the public lands was no longer
an unbridled privilege, but the boundary of regulatory control was deter-
mined by the reasonableness of the mining endeavor judged as such.
Nevertheless, the Act began to moderate a miner's expectations of free
development and emphasized the need to make mining a regulated
industry.
The Forest Service has also produced regulations applicable to min-
ing activities on federal lands. 17 The Forest Service regulations strike a
fundamental compromise between the rights of mineral owners and pro-
tection of federal lands. Miners have "a statutory right to enter upon the
public lands to search for minerals [but their operations] shall be con-
§ 3809.0-2(a) (1989); see Kimball, supra note 100, at 515-16; Shanahan, Hardrock Mining on
the Public Lands, 2 PUB. LAND L. REV. 57, 71 (1981).
112. Some other issues have been addressed. See, e.g., Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150,
156-57 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (disturbing ecology of area and excluding public exceeded casual use
and therefore required miner to submit a plan of operations for BLM approval). Courts have
shown deference to Forest Service regulations attempting to control mining impacts. See
United States v. Doremus, 658 F. Supp. 752, 758 (D. Idaho 1987) (regulation prohibiting the
"damaging [ofl any natural feature" not unconstitutionally vague).
113. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-615 (1988).
114. Id. § 612; see also id. § 601. See generally Kimball, supra note 100, at 512-13; Miller,
supra note 103, at 781-88.
115. Lower courts have held that the Act requires the claimant to tolerate some other uses
of the land on which the claim is located. See, e.g., Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333, 337
(10th Cir. 1989) (no injury if other uses do not interfere with mining); United States v. Fahey,
769 F.2d 829, 837 (1st Cir. 1985) (no expectation of privacy on mining claim); United States v.
Curtis-Nevada Mines, 611 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1980) (claim holders cannot bar public
recreational use of land unless claim is actually being mined and public access interferes with
the mining activity).
116. United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980); Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969).
But see Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 28, at 224-29 (right to manage other resources did not
give the BLM the right to manage mineral deposits or grant correlative rights to surface
owner); Miller, supra note 103, at 787 (Richardson based on misreading of cases concerned
with non-mining uses of lands).
117. 36 C.F.R. § 228 (1989).
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ducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National
Forest System surface resources."" 8 The Forest Service may not pro-
hibit mining, but may regulate mining activities." 9
This compromise. is required by the Forest Service Organic Act,
which forbids action that "would prohibit any person from entering upon
such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including ...
prospecting, locating, and developing.., mineral resources." 20 By con-
trast, the BLM is not required by statute to allow all mineral develop-
ment to proceed. Although some statutes applicable to the BLM
emphasize mineral development, they refer only to critical mineral
needs.' 21 Thus, the BLM's statutory mandate would allow it to strike a
balance between mineral development and other activities, rather than
always approving mineral development.
Nevertheless, the mining regulations issued by the BLM after
FLPMA's enactment mirror the restricted interpretation of unnecessary
or undue degradation that grew out of the wilderness review process and
ensuing litigation.' 22 The regulations allow the BLM to fine tune devel-
opment, but emphasize making the exercise of preexisting rights feasible,
both in economic and legal terms. Under these regulations, degradation
is "unnecessary" if chosen means are not truly needed to achieve the
desired end because alternative means exist. It is "undue" if the best
feasible methods economically possible are not used. The regulations es-
sentially compress the two requirements into one investigation.
23
118. Id. § 228.1. The regulation further states that its purposes do not include manage-
ment of mineral resources. Id.
119. Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854
(1988) (Forest Service may not prohibit use or circumscribe it too strictly); United States v.
Weiss, 642 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1981) (Forest Service authorized to minimize harm, not to
encroach on mining rights). See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Plan-
ning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 254-61 (1985) (public and political opinion has
encouraged Forest Service to regulate mining operations more closely; whether agency could
sanction noncompliance remains unclear).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1988). For history and interpretation of the Forest Service Organic
Act, see Weiss, 642 F.2d at 297-98; Izaak Walton League v. St. Claire, 353 F. Supp. 698, 702,
713 (D. Minn 1973); Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 119, at 46-60.
121. For example, the President is required to "coordinate the responsible departments
and agencies to ... encourage federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of
domestic resources to meet critical materials needs." National Materials and Minerals Policy,
Research & Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. § 1602(7) (1988) (emphasis added); see Min-
ing and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 219 (1988).
122. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
123. The BLM's most recent regulatory definition of the statutory standard, in a rule gov-
erning rights-of-way, also adopts the accommodation principle. This new definition is virtually
identical to that given in the regulations governing activities outside WSA's. Compare 43
C.F.R. § 2800.0-5(x) (1989) with id. § 3809.0-5(k). Cf Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 64, at
279 ("minimum tool" approach reflects accommodation under the Wilderness Act; it would




C. Judicial Interpretation of Unnecessary or Undue Degradation
Only a few courts have analyzed FLPMA's unnecessary or undue
degradation standard. These judicial decisions have not yet finally re-
solved the boundaries of the BLM's authority under FLPMA. Examina-
tion of these cases demonstrates that, although FLPMA's directive to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation does not give the BLM unlim-
ited authority, it is not a toothless charge. The BLM need not rubber-
stamp plans or blindly accept current methods and uses.
The unnecessary or undue degradation standard does allow the
BLM to prevent haphazard misuses of the public lands. The Department
of the Interior has asserted that, because it may prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation, the WSA grandfather clause does not require the
BLM to tolerate the continuation of excessive or unwarranted activi-
ties.124 A federal district court apparently adopted this view when it de-
clared that "careful" commercial timber harvesting might not violate the
standard.125 Wanton or unnecessarily destructive existing uses, however,
need not be allowed to continue.
Other courts have also recognized that the "unnecessary or undue
degradation" clause provides the BLM with considerable regulatory
muscle, at least with regard to activities affecting WSA's. For example,
the Tenth Circuit has held that the BLM has the authority, and in some
circumstances the duty, to order a right-of-way to be moved from its
current location. In Sierra Club v. Hodel, the court ordered the BLM to
review a county's improvement of twenty-eight miles of right-of-way to
determine if that improvement would cause unnecessary or undue degra-
dation of a WSA. 126 The county planned to upgrade a one-lane dirt road
to a two-lane graveled road. The route of the dirt road passed through a
mile of riparian area. The court held that if widening and graveling that
section would cause unnecessary or undue degradation of the WSA, the
BLM could require use of a less harmful route. 127 In essence, the court
declared that the BLM's duty was to satisfy the purpose of the private
right, but not necessarily to preserve the status quo. The BLM could
force abandonment of the old right-of-way so long as it approved an al-
ternate means of achieving the same end. 128
124. Solicitor II, supra note 85, at 914 n.6.
125. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 (D. Utah 1979). As support for this proposi-
tion, the Utah court quoted the brief of the American Mining Congress: "A reasonable inter-
pretation of the word 'unnecessary' is that which is not necessary for mining. 'Undue' is that
which is excessive, improper, immoderate, or unwarranted." Id. at 1005 n.13.
126. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988). Because the Sierra Club failed
to allege duties under the general management directive, only the FLPMA provision dealing
with management of WSA's was considered in this case. Id. at 1100.
127. Id. at 1088.
128. Id. This holding echoes the accommodation doctrine. See infra notes 152-55, 167-76
and accompanying text. Reasonable available alternatives must be employed if they would
[Vol. 18:43
UNNECESSAR Y OR UNDUE DEGRADATION
In Sierra Club v. Hodel, the Tenth Circuit treated impacts from ac-
tivities occurring on land surrounded by WSA's and those from more
distant undertakings somewhat differently. Thirty percent of the route
proposed for the two-lane road formed the boundary between two
WSA's. 129 The court continued the lower court order enjoining con-
struction on this stretch of road pending proper compliance with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 30 and held that the duty to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation made the construction a fed-
eral action.' 3 ' In reaching its decision, the court implicitly held that
road construction on lands directly adjoining a WSA could unduly or
unnecessarily degrade the WSA; therefore, the BLM would have to com-
ply with NEPA before allowing construction in such areas.'
3 2
The court did not foreclose the possibility that construction could
also cause unnecessary or undue degradation even where the road was
not directly adjacent to a WSA.' 33 The decision clearly sanctioned ex-
tension of WSA management to activities beyond the boundaries of the
WSA, if such activities could cause unnecessary or undue degradation. '34
Thus, the court held that permissible regulation under FLPMA may ex-
tend beyond the physical boundaries of the land directly protected by the
statute.
The Ninth Circuit has also examined the BLM's authority under
FLPMA, holding that the BLM may not, under the unnecessary or un-
due degradation standard, completely forbid an activity which Congress
cause less impact on the servient estate's existing uses. The private right, however, is dominant
o and must be fulfilled. As the district court summarized, in this case the BLM required that
each project "employ the latest available technology and the least degrading alternatives."
Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594, 610 (D. Utah 1987). For further proceedings in this
case following remand, see Sierra Club v. Hodel, 737 F.Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1990); Sierra Club,
111 Interior Bd. Land App. 122 (1989) (BLM finding that graveling road would produce no
significant environmental impact upheld; similar finding with respect to paving overturned);
Sierra Club, 108 Interior Bd. Land App. 381 (1989) (BLM decision to approve upgrade with
mitigation stayed pending appeal).
129. Sierra Club v. Hodel 848 F.2d at 1085. Ten miles bordered one WSA and twelve
miles bordered the other, with some overlap. Id. at 1092. These sections of the road were
clearly adjacent to WSA's. Regarding the meaning of "adjacent" see supra note 70.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988).
131. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1090-91.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1096. The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to ex-
amine the evidence and determine if the injunction should be continued as to the portions of
the road not directly adjacent to WSA's. The trial court was told to dissolve the injunction
with respect to those parts of the route that did not border a WSA and would not lead to
unnecessary or undue degradation. Id. On remand the injunction was lifted in part. Sierra
Club v. Hodel, 737 F. Supp. 629, 632 (D. Utah 1990).
134. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1096. On one level, this case did not involve regula-
tion beyond federal boundaries because the United States retained the fee interest underlying
the county's right-of-way. See id. at 1073 & n. 1. The court, however, relied only on the provi-
sions dealing with WSA's; the road was not within a WSA, or, in some places, even directly
adjacent to one. Id. at 1090.
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has implicitly authorized. In Sierra Club v. Clark, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined a BLM decision to permit an off-road motorcycle race on BLM
lands in the Mojave Desert.13 5 The Sierra Club argued that the race
would cause "unnecessary or undue degradation" because the potential
environmental damage from the race would be "severe, and in some
cases irreversible."1 36 The Sierra Club claimed that these environmental
impacts were neither necessary nor appropriate, and were thus "un-
due." 137 As a result, the Sierra Club contended, FLPMA required that
the BLM prohibit the race.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Sierra Club's argument, reasoning
that off-road vehicle traffic would cause the same type of destruction in
any portion of the desert region. 38 Congress, however, had declared
some off-road use acceptable.139 Therefore, the court declined to inter-
pret the unnecessary or undue degradation standard to compel the BLM
to prohibit all use of off-road vehicles. 140 The decision does not foreclose
site-specific banning of activities that could proceed in other locales with-
out causing similar harm.' 4 ' The court simply refused to read FLPMA
as authorizing the BLM to categorically enjoin an entire class of
activities.
III
THE PRIVATE ANALOGUE: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MINERAL AND SURFACE OWNERS
Public land law does not exist in a vacuum. Other types of law also
moderate conflicting property rights. This part explores one particularly
relevant paradigm: the law governing the relationship between private
owners of mineral and surface rights. 142 When the mineral and surface
135. Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). The area involved is part of the
California Desert Conservation Area. See 43 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988).
136. Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d at 1410.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(4) which requires the BLM to manage California
deserts to provide, inter alia, "outdoor recreation uses," including the use, where appropriate,
of off-road recreational vehicles).
140. Id.
141. Nor does the decision in Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) necessarily
preclude a finding that the BLM could forbid specific activities in specific areas. Conner in-
volved an oil and gas lease, and the court held that absent a stipulation of no surface occu-
pancy, a contractual right to develop precluded prohibition of necessary drilling. Despite this
apparent limit on BLM authority, the holding does not foreclose a BLM denial of development
under the unnecessary and undue degradation standard because authority under FLPMA was
not argued.
142. Naturally, private rights other than mineral rights may impact public lands, and the
BLM may seek to regulate their exercise under the unnecessary or undue degradation stan-
dard. Mineral law precedent may be useful in determining the extent of these other rights
because it reveals that property rights are subject to change. Mineral law is not directly rele-
vant to other private owners' expectations about developing their property. Changing views of
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rights to a single plot of land are held by different parties, property rights
often conflict at a basic level. Two distinct interests exist, and the exer-
cise of either one could greatly impede the usefulness of the other. The
law regulating these situations can be used to give content to FLPMA's
unnecessary or undue degradation standard.
A. Development of the Doctrine: Traditional Restraints on Dominance
Under traditional common law doctrine, an owner of land con-
trolled it from the heavens to the center of the earth. 1 43 The owner could
carve land into different estates, separating the right to enjoy the surface,
for example, by farming or building, from the right to remove miner-
als. I" When rights to land had been divided in this manner, all parties
might need or want to use the surface to pursue the benefits of their
respective estates. If the parties had failed to specify their relative rights
by deed, the common law resolved conflicts among them by making the
mineral estate dominant.' 45 One justification for allowing the mineral
estate to assert its rights to the detriment of the surface estate was that
the mineral estate's benefit could only be realized through mineral
production. 146
the nature of public lands, however, would be as relevant to these prospective users as to
mineral users.
The law of easements is another relevant private analogue. The easement owner, holder of
the dominant estate, must not unreasonably burden the servient estate. See, e.g., Ryan v.
Southern Natural Gas Co., 879 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1989). For a comparison of WSA
management to the law of easements, see Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1087 (10th Cir.
1988).
143. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (he who owns the land
owns everything above it and everything beneath it).
144. An owner may create as many separate estates as there are different minerals or strata
of minerals. See, e.g., Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 651, 180 N.W. 787, 789
(1920); Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 294, 25 A. 597, 598 (1893). See
generally Lear, Multiple Mineral Development Conflicts: An Armageddon in Simultaneous Min-
eral Operations?, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 79, 81-89 (1988) (discussing conflicts that
result from application of traditional property law and mining techniques to subjacent
deposits).
145. See Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 562-608
(1972) (dominance of the mineral estate derived from king's right to do everything necessary
and proper to coin money); see also Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates - Right to
Use, Damage, or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411,
412-14 (1974); Huffman, The Allocative Impacts of Mineral Severance: Implications for the
Regulation of Surface Mining, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 203-06 (1982); Lopez, Up-
stairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 995, 996-98 (1980). But see Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of
Surface and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874-76 (1980) (respective rights should
be determined by deed and policy rather than by relying upon custom).
146. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922); Martz, Love & Kai-
ser, supra note 57, at 1077. Courts are also reluctant to forbid mineral production because it
forwards the public interest by providing raw materials. Chartiers Block, 152 Pa. at 297, 25 A.
at 599; see Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988); Minerals Policy,
Research & Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1602 (1988).
1991]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
The rule of dominance was never absolute. 147 Two doctrines have
evolved which moderate the rights of mineral owners. First, the mineral
estate owes a duty of subjacent support to the surface estate. 148 The min-
eral estate owner is liable for subsidence, even if the damage results from
proper mining techniques rather than from negligence. 149 Second, the
mineral owner may use only so much of the surface as is reasonably nec-
essary to recover the minerals.3 0 This doctrine at first glance might
seem to provide added protection to the surface, but it has a dual func-
tion. The mineral owner's "necessity" can be used to justify uses that
damage the surface.' 5'
The interplay of the dominance principle with these two moderating
doctrines led to the development of three models for reconciling the com-
peting interests of private surface and mineral estate owners: the "ac-
commodation" doctrine of reasonable use; the equitable balancing of
"correlative rights;" and the "compensation principle" employed when
the desired mining technique is too destructive to be permitted without
paying damages. Each restrains the dominance of the mineral estate to
some degree, but they differ in the degree of deference shown to surface
concerns. These models could, by analogy, help resolve conflicts between
private rights and public land values. More importantly for a resolution
of the contours of the BLM's authority, a survey of judicial methods for
resolving private conflicts demonstrates that the degree of legal protec-
tion given to specific property rights may change over time.
B. Reasonable Necessity and Due Regard: Toward Accommodation
The accommodation doctrine, developed in the context of oil and
gas leases, is one method courts have used to protect the interests of sur-
face owners. Accommodation requires the oil and gas developer to avoid
147. See generally Ferguson, supra note 145; Hultin, Recent Developments in Statutory and
Judicial Accommodation Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 1021 (1988) (mineral lessees liable to surface owners for damage caused by activity not
"reasonable and necessary" for mining operations); Kramer, Conflicts Between the Exploitation
of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The Case For Reciprocal Accommodation, 21 Hous. L. REV. 49
(1984) (developmental conflicts a result of Anglo-American system of property ownership).
148. Dycus, supra note 145, at 874-79. See generally Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support
and the Right to Totally Destroy the Surface in Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 497, 498-99 (1961) (absent waiver, "the surface estate is entitled to support which it
requires in its natural condition from the underlying mineral estate").
149. Breeding v. Koch Carbon, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (W.D. Va. 1989) (strict
liability standard for damage to land and buildings when subjacent support is withdrawn un-
less the buildings contributed to subsistence); Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048,
1050 (1850). But see Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961)
(duty of subjacent support may be waived by implication).
150. Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 519, 34 P.2d 278, 279 (1934), overruled
on other grounds, Pure Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 181 Okla. 618, 622, 75 P.2d 464, 468 (1936); see
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW §§ 218.4-.8 (1989).
151. See, e.g., Dycus, supra note 145, at 879-80.
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substantially impairing existing surface uses if reasonable alternatives
exist. 52
The typical oil and gas lease grants the lessee the exclusive right to
drill for and produce the oil and gas beneath the leased tract. 53 If the
lease contains no express provisions for surface use, the lessee may reach
the oil and gas estate through an implied easement of use.' 54 The lessee
may use the portion of the surface that is reasonably necessary for min-
eral production to the exclusion of the surface owner. 55
Under the traditional dominance regime, the mineral owner or
lessee was said to be liable only for wanton or negligent damage, or for
use of more land than necessary.15 6 The surface owner could not recover
damages for any injury to the surface caused by ordinary develop-
ment. 57 Despite this rule, courts required mineral estate owners to con-
sider impacts on surface owners in designing their operations. 58 This
judicially imposed requirement created a tension between surface and
mineral rights.
Traditionally, the standard that activities be "reasonably necessary"
for mineral production was used primarily as a sword to authorize a
lessee's activities despite disturbance of surface uses. 159 Reasonableness
152. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
153. Mansfield, Relief From Express Drilling Obligations in an Uneconomic Market: The
Federal Response and the Doctrines Of Force Majeure, Commercial Impracticability and the
Prudent Operator, 22 TULSA L.J. 483, 515-16 (1987).
154. If the lease specifies the lessee's rights to use the surface, those specific contractual
provisions will control. The implied easement supplements any noncontradictory lease term
about surface use. This implied easement is similar to the common law "way of necessity"
which arises when a subdivision creates a landlocked parcel. See Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171
N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969); Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Ct. App.
1967).
155. See Placid Oil, 171 N.W.2d at 834-35.
156. Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 301 P.2d 686, 688 (Okla. 1956); Browder, The Dominant
Oil and Gas Estate - Master or Servant of the Servient Estate, 17 Sw. L.J. 25, 42-43 (1963); see
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).
157. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 134 n.4 (N.D. 1979). Statutes have
altered the traditional rule in some jurisdictions. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
But see Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners - What Happens When Judges Make Law
and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D.L. REV. 41 (1987) (companies, surface owners, and legislatures
act as if lessee liable for damages from normal use of surface despite law).
158. See Browder, supra note 156, at 27-31; Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa.
286, 296, 25 A. 597, 598 (1893) (mineral owner may enter surface "as might be necessary" but
"with due regard to the owner of the surface").
159. For example, the placement of oil or gas wells close to residences or other buildings
often displeased lessors, but if these wells enhanced production courts usually allowed them to
remain. See, e.g., Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Browder, supra note 156, at 27-35. Production facilities occupying large amounts of surface
space, such as tank batteries, were also generally allowed, but the lessee could not use them to
store or treat significant quantities of oil from other lands. See Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v.
Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (implied surface easement authorizes place-
ment of gas pipeline across land if pipeline services only well for unit that includes leased
land). Compare Norum v. Queen City Oil Co., 81 Mont. 527, 264 P. 122 (1928) (extensive
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was tested "unidimensionally": if the questioned activity was not negli-
gent and served a valid business purpose it was generally permitted.1
6°
As one court recently declared, "[s]adly for the surface owner, [the law]
... implies that a mineral lease gives a large measure of deference to the
lessee's view of reasonableness."'' 61 The mineral estate remains dominant
despite the fact that some moderation of the superiority of rights has
occurred.
The Texas courts of the late 1960's and early 1970's began to recon-
sider the meaning of reasonable necessity. First, these courts made ne-
cessity a true limitation on the mineral owner's use of the surface, rather
than simply a justification for such use. 162 A 1967 case emphasized the
surface owner's right to use the surface as desired so long as no "unrea-
sonable interference" with the lessee's use resulted. 63 This case served
notice that the Texas courts would no longer rubberstamp a lessee's
claim of necessity; protection of the lessor's interest could justify imposi-
tion of some inconvenience on the lessee. 164
Shortly thereafter, in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 165 Texas adopted the
accommodation doctrine, which required even more from the lessee.
The surface owner in Jones had installed a center-pivot irrigation system,
identified as the most practical farming method for the location. 166
Getty subsequently drilled two new oil wells on the plot. The beam
pumps Getty installed to serve these wells interfered with the irrigation
system but were, the court found, reasonably necessary for produc-
tion.' 67 Another oil operator, faced with a similar conflict, had used al-
ternative production methods that did not make center-pivot irrigation
impossible. ' 68
structures on surface allowed as reasonable) and Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo.
321, 329-36, 278 P.2d 798, 802-03 (1955) (dwelling houses reasonably incident to mining oper-
ation permitted) with Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 21, 100 P.2d 528,
534 (1940) (storing oil products from outside surface owner's land is an injury not permitted
by doctrine of reasonable surface use or statute).
160. See Kramer, supra note 147, at 60-61. Therefore, under traditional theory, appraisal
of mineral development consistently resulted in the decision to allow development.
161. Vest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 1985).
162. See Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 87, 344 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961).
163. Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
164. Some other isolated cases restrained oppressive acts by lessees. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil
Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1397 (Okla. 1973) (lessee must remove slush pits when surface use
no longer required); Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 289 Ark. 582, 585, 715 S.W.2d
444, 446 (1986) (lessee must restore surface).
165. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971). Some commentators refer to the accommodation doc-
trine as the doctrine of alternative means. See, e.g., Broyles, Oil and Gas Producers v. Coal
Producers, Planning Impacts of a Developing Judicial Policy, 15 FORUM 481, 482 (1980).
166. Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622.
167. Id. at 620-21.
168. Two of this operator's wells were serviced by short hydraulic pumps; two others used
beam pumps lowered into pits. Id. at 620.
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The Jones court recognized the importance of both the mineral and
surface estates. The court noted that, when land was capable of both
agricultural and mineral production, public policy required that an ac-
commodation between the two uses be reached, allowing realization of
all possible benefits.169 Therefore, if a planned mineral development
would interfere with an existing surface use, the mineral lessee would
have to use any reasonable less damaging alternative means to accom-
plish its purpose. 70 Refusal to use the less damaging alternative would
be unreasonable, and hence an unauthorized use of the surface.' 7' Getty
could not prevail merely because the alternative would cost more than its
desired method. 72 If the increase in costs was so great as to render pro-
duction unprofitable, however, the less disruptive option would be con-
sidered unreasonable and need not be adopted.
The accommodation doctrine, as a model, treats reasonableness in a
"multidimensional" manner. 73 Mineral development that is reasonable
in one setting may not be reasonable in another situation involving a
different surface use. Under the multidimensional method, the mineral
estate may substantially interfere with surface uses, but only if no reason-
able alternative exists. The accommodation model does not, however,
employ a straight balancing process. It continues to favor the mineral
estate. 74 Where no reasonable alternative to the proposed method ex-
ists, the test reverts to the unidimensional question of whether the pro-
posed use is nonnegligent and will enhance mineral production. 75 The
mineral and surface estates remain in a dominant and servient
relationship. 76
169. Id. at 622-23.
170. Id. at 623.
171. The reasonableness of a use is tested by comparison with "usual, customary, and
reasonable practices in the industry under like circumstances of time, place, and servient estate
use." Id. at 627 (emphasis added); cf Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. Smith, 771 P.2d 1006, 1008
(Okla. 1989) (under statute requiring oil and gas lessee to pay damages for any surface use,
damages to entire surface tract are considered, including whether lessee's use interferes with
irrigation).
172. Lowering the pumps would have cost an additional $12,000, but might have de-
creased maintenance costs; a hydraulic pump would have increased initial costs by $5000 and
also increased operating costs. Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622.
173. See Hultin, supra note 147, at 1072-73; Kramer, supra note 147, at 60-61; Lopez,
supra note 145, at 1010.
174. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137 (N.D. 1979) ("The surface
owner must show that under the circumstances, the use of the surface under attack is not
reasonably necessary.").
175. See id. at 135-37. A number of other states have also adopted the accommodation
doctrine. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 891, 511 S.W.2d 160,
163 (1974); Einsig v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 69 Pa. Commw. 351, 452 A.2d 558 (1982);
Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976); Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin,
267 S.E.2d 721, 725-26 (W. Va. 1980).
176. Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 138. Because the accommodation doctrine requires a
greater consideration of surface uses than the tradititional dominance doctrine, one might say
that it allows traffic to flow in two directions in determining the propriety of a use. However,
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C. Correlative Rights: The Rule of Reason
The correlative rights 177 model reconciles conflicting interests in
land without making one estate dominant. Under this doctrine, each
competing estate deserves protection; neither estate owner may exercise
its rights without due regard for the other. Duties are reciprocal and
rights co-equal; a neutral rule of reason governs, allowing site-specific
balancing of the two interests. The doctrine is by its very definition flexi-
ble and incapable of expression by hard-and-fast rules.
The correlative rights doctrine as a way to resolve conflicting rights
in different resources originated in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon. 178
In that case, the fee owner conveyed a particular stratum of coal to the
plaintiff and then leased the oil and gas below the coal to the defendant,
who drilled several wells through the coal stratum.1 79 The court denied
the coal company's request for an injunction without fully explaining its
rationale.' 80  Nevertheless, the court indicated that the coal estate was
defined by its purpose, namely removal of the mineral. Accordingly, in
conveying the coal rights, the fee owner relinquished only the coal and
the access needed to remove it. "sI The fee owner retained all other rights
in the land, both above the coal and below it.182 The court refused to
grant the requested injunction because it would have prevented recovery
of minerals located below the coal.18 3
surface and mineral concerns are not treated equally. The accommodation road is not a two-
lane highway but a three-lane one: the mineral interest receives an extra passing lane.
177. "Correlative rights" is a term used to refer to co-equal rights in a common resource.
It was initially applied to rights in common pools of oil and gas. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U.S. 190, 210 (1900) (upholding oil and gas conservation statute because preventing waste
protected private property "from being taken by one of the common owners without regard to
the enjoyment of the others"). Some courts say mineral and surface rights should not be
considered correlative. See, e.g., Hunt Oil Co., 283 N.W.2d at 138 ("[T]he term 'correlative
rights'... is more appropriately used in referring to rights among various owners of mineral
interests."). Other courts have intimated that mineral and surface owners also have correlative
rights. See Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 387
F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1968); Rostocil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 210 Kan. 400, 502 P.2d 825
(1972). •
178. 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893). Although Chartiers Block involved a conflict between
mineral interests, its reasoning depended upon the rights retained by a surface owner after an
initial mineral' severance. Therefore, it also could apply to conflicts between surface and min-
eral owners.
179. Id at 297, 25 A. at 597.
180. Id. at 298, 25 A. at 599. The court refused to find that the surface owner's rights to
reach the oil and gas gave rise to a way of necessity, but denied the injunction nonetheless.
181. Id. at 295-96, 25 A. at 598 (mineral owner enters under "a right growing out of the
contract of sale, the position of the stratum sold, and the impossibility of reaching it in any
other manner"). Justice Williams expanded on this concept in his concurrence. See infra note
184.
182. Chartiers Block, 152 Pa. at 297-98, 25 A. at 598-99; see Gearhart v. McAlester Fuel
Co., 199 Ark. 981, 984-85, 136 S.W.2d 679, 680 (1940) ("surface" is more than "portion of the
land which is or may be used for agricultural purposes").
183. Chartiers Block, 152 Pa. at 299, 25 A. at 599 (public policy forbids leaving "owner of
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The concurring opinion in Chartiers Block looked to the natural lay-
ering of resources for an inherent definition of rights: the surface estate
needed support and the mineral estate needed access.18 4 Neither estate
could be developed without infringing on the other. Courts could ac-
commodate and reconcile these competing uses in the same way that
they controlled a surface owner's right to subjacent support. In this situ-
ation, the right of access to the oil and gas could be made subject to any
precautions necessary to preserve the coal estate. The oil and gas owner
could also be required to compensate the coal owner for any actual
injury. 185
Later Pennsylvania cases combined the approaches of the majority
and concurring opinions in Chartiers Block to allow a judicial balancing
of rights.18 6 Using similar reasoning, other courts have held that physi-
cal realities must govern the relationships between holders of naturally
adjacent property interests.18 7
A scheme based on the ordering of nature has intuitive appeal,
although weighing the rights of the conflicting estates on this basis may
be difficult. As one case has described this exercise,
[E]ach of the parties is entitled to prevent the other from exercising its
rights of ownership of the severed estate arbitrarily, capriciously, oppres-
sively, or wantonly and thereby depriving the other of its respective es-
tate, but each may use the respective estates in a reasonable, prudent
manner, having due regard to and consistent with the interests and rights
of the other.188
The correlative rights model is thus inherently flexible. The owner of
each estate must act rationally and consider the goals of the other. The
the surface at the absolute mercy of the owner of the coal").
184. Justice Williams stated that
One who buys a single stratum is bound to know where it is, and how it is situated
with reference to the strata above and below it; and he must be conclusively pre-
sumed to have taken title subject to the servitudes imposed by nature upon it as the
necessary consequence of its position among the rocks that underlie the surface....
They are ... the reciprocal obligations of access and support.
Id. at 300, 25 A. at 600 (Williams, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 296, 25 A. at 597.
186. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 300,
302, 95 A. 471, 472 (1915). Outside of Pennsylvania, the "rule of reason" balancing used in
Chartiers Block supplemented a way of necessity for access to lower strata. Hoffstat v. Dicken-
son, 71 F. Supp. 897, 903-05 (S.D. W.Va. 1947); Pyramid Coal Co. v. Pratt, 229 Ind. 648, 655,
99 N.E.2d 427, 429-30 (1951) (owners of land who sold stratum of coal have right of access
through stratum via water well to underlying strata).
187. See, e.g., Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643, 649 (E.D. La. 1966)
(correlative rights language used in resolving conflict between mineral lessee and owner of fee);
Mid-America Terminal, Inc. v. Owensboro River Sand & Gravel Co., 532 S.W.2d 437, 441
(Ky. 1975) (bed of river analogized to a mineral estate retained by the surface owner); Guffey
v. Stroud, 16 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929) (right to take oil included right to
"so much of the gas as was necessary in the proper drilling of oil" despite separate lease for
gas).
188. Mid-America Terminal, 532 S.W.2d at 441.
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standards that govern the reciprocal duties are "arbitrary" and "wanton"
on one hand, and "reasonable" and "prudent" on the other. In making
these determinations, courts must consider all of the surrounding facts.
No hard-and-fast formula exists for resolving these disputes.
Correlative rights analysis differs from the accommodation doctrine
because it rejects mineral estate dominance. Although conflicts may re-
quire that one estate yield to the other, the surface estate need not always
be the one to yield. 189 In a given instance, the value of the surface estate
might outweigh that of the mineral estate. In such a case, under the
correlative rights model, the mineral estate would have to give way.
D. Mineral Rights Without Mining Authority
Traditional theory made the mineral estate dominant, a result man-
dated by the idea that it necessarily carried with it the right to extract
minerals by any reasonable means. 190 Few serious conflicts between sur-
face and mineral estates occurred when the pick and shovel dominated
mining. Changes in both mining methods and the minerals sought, how-
ever, have forced reassessment of the premise that underlies the domi-
nance principle. Seeking to protect surface owners from destructive
mining techniques, some courts have held that a conveyance of mineral
rights does not necessarily include ownership of all mineral resources or
the right to use strip or surface mining. Some jurisdictions have adopted
another approach, allowing the mineral owner to employ destructive
methods but granting the surface owner compensation for the resulting
damage.
1. Prohibition of Surface Mining
Mineral estate dominance produces particularly harsh results when
the mineral estate consists of sand, gravel, or surface-recoverable ura-
nium or lignite. These substances do not occur in deposits that can be
reached economically by drilling or tunneling under the surface. They
must be removed by strip or surface mining, which destroys the surface,
precluding other surface uses. 191
Inventive courts have developed two main responses to the problems
posed by strip and surface mines. In order to avoid allowing the mineral
189. To complete the highway analogy developed in note 176, correlative rights would be
the equivalent of a full, four-lane highway. Both mineral and surface values would be afforded
passing lanes. Neither interest would be given an advantage; in resolving disputes, courts
would seek to fulfill both values.
190. Because removal is essential to the enjoyment of a mineral estate, this traditional view
usually conforms to the parties' intentions when minerals are severed from a surface estate.
Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949).
191. See, e.g., Nevill, Multiple Uses and Conflicting Rights, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 783, 784-
85 (1982) (surface mine producing 5.5 million tons of lignite per year will destroy 3000 acres of
surface in five years).
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estate owner to destroy the surface, these courts have held either that a
conveyance does not permit surface mining, or that a general conveyance
of "minerals" does not include resources which must be surface
mined. 192
The first approach protects the surface owner even when a deed
clearly conveys a specified mineral and the right to mine it. Neverthe-
less, some courts have refused to countenance strip mining in the absence
of express authorization in such a deed. Their decisions have focused on
the incongruity of either reserving or conveying the surface estate in a
deed if the mineral owner holds the power to destroy that estate at
will.193 They have refused to assume that the conveyance implicitly
waived the common law right to subjacent support. 194 By requiring a
clear statement to waive the right of subjacent support, these courts have
moved toward a substantive rule governing mineral rights.' 95
Other courts have protected surface owners by excluding specific
substances from a general mineral conveyance. In most of these cases,
the word "mineral" was used as a catch all in a deed. Despite the use of
the generic term, some courts have found that particular resources were
192. See generally Dycus, supra note 145, at 874-79; Kramer, supra note 147, at 67-68.
193. Courts have justified these decisions either on explicit policy grounds or based on the
supposed intent of the parties. See, e.g., Payne v. Hoover, Inc., 486 So. 2d 426 (Ala. 1986);
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 248 n.4, 313 N.E.2d 374, 377 n.4 (1974)
("right to use" cannot include right to strip mine or basic purpose of two estates perverted);
Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 386-87, 170 A.2d 97, 98 (1961);
see also Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 185, 313 S.W.2d 839, 842 (1958)
(mineral owner must pay damages or conveyance a nullity); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo.
356, 362, 236 P. 1023, 1026 (1925) (customary mining method repugnant to general law). On
the relationship between strip mining and the right to subjacent support, see Note, Alternative
Approaches to Analyzing the Intent of the Parties Upon Severance of Mineral and Surface Es-
tates in Iowa, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1365, 1378 (1975).
194. The common law doctrine of subjacent support required the mineral owner to main-
tain the surface estate's natural support. For underground mining, this would require leaving
sufficient minerals to prevent subsidence. Strip mining, in contrast, removes the surface itself.
Mineral deeds specifying that mining could occur without liability for damages or with liability
limited to a predetermined amount have been variously interpreted as waivers of the common
law rights. Compare Victor-American Fuel Co. v. Wiggins, 746 P.2d 58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)
(mere reservation of right to use surface for specified damage payment insufficient to authorize
strip mine) and Breeding v. Koch Carbon, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 645, 650 (W.D. Va. 1989) (sever-
ance of coal alone does not constitute waiver) with Alpine Constr. Corp. v. Fenton, 764 P.2d
1340, 1342-43 (Okla. 1988) (enforcing damage provision when deed specific) and Ball v. Island
Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (W.D. Va. 1989) (clear waiver of support allows
underground mining method that creates more subsidence than traditional techniques). Clear
exculpatory clauses have been read to excuse not only negligent but willful and wanton actions
by the mineral estate owner. Holmes v. Alabama Title Co., 507 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987). See
generally Bratt and Greenwell, Kentucky's Broadform Deed Amendment: Constitutional Con-
siderations, 5 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 9 (1989-90) (discussing express waivers of liability for dam-
age caused by mineral owner's use of surface commonly contained in mineral deeds).
195. But see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.




not conveyed to the holder of the mineral estate, but rather remained
with the surface. 196 Various interpretive tests have been developed to
determine which minerals have been conveyed and which have not.
197
These tests, most of which claim to determine the parties' intent, are both
confused and confusing.
2. Compensation
Haphazard judicial attempts to protect surface owners by seeking
the specific intent of parties to a deed did not prove satisfactory. Under
this approach, parties were often unable to predict the effect of a convey-
ance. The difficulties and disparate results led Professor Eugene Kuntz
to suggest another method of resolving the conflict between mineral and
surface estates. Professor Kuntz argued that the ownership of resources
should be determined in accordance with the means by which the re-
sources are enjoyed. Thus, the mineral estate should "own" and be enti-
tled to remove all resources that obtain their value from severance from
the soil. If removal destroyed the surface, however, the mineral owner
should compensate the surface owner for the damage. 198 Requiring com-
pensation for surface damage adds an element of fairness to the domi-
nance of the mineral estate.
Two jurisdictions have adopted this compensation compromise. In
Barker v. Mintz, 199 decided before Professor Kuntz's article appeared,
the Colorado Supreme Court used basic equitable balancing to compare
the value of the surface estate with that of the mineral estate. The court
allowed surface mining, but required the mineral owner to compensate
the surface owner for damages. This resolution, the court stated, would
allow both owners to receive the full value of their property.2°°
196. See, e.g., Commissioners of Land Office v. Butler, 743 P.2d 1334 (Okla. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988) (reservation of interest in "oil, gas and other mineral rights" did
not include coal); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (substances
such as sand, gravel, and limestone, as they usually occur, are not "minerals" within the ordi-
nary and natural meaning of the word, unless they are exceptional in character).
197. Some courts employ the rule ofejusdem generis when the collective word "minerals"
is used together with listing of specific minerals; others seek the "normal and natural" or
"scientific" meaning of the word "minerals." Courts differ on whether to limit their scrutiny
to the deed itself, or to allow evidence of the state of knowledge of either the parties or the
community. See, e.g., McDonald v. Snyder Const. Co., 744 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(reservation in deed granting right to "all coal, oil, gas, lead, zinc, and other materials" permit-
ted removal of fill material of silica rock and clay from estate). An extensive discussion of the
meaning of the word "mineral" is beyond the scope of this Article. For two excellent discus-
sions of this issue see Lowe, What Substances are Minerals?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-
1 (1984); Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals," 54 N.D.L. REV. 419 (1978).
198. Kuntz, supra note 190, at 115.
199. 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
200. Id. at 266, 215 P. at 534-35. Additionally, since 1874 Colorado has by statute re-
quired mineral owners to post a bond before mining a severed estate. 1874 Colo. Sess. Laws
1888, § 12 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-48-106 (1973)).
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Texas, proceeding in two stages, has also adopted the compensation
principle. In Acker v. Guinn,20 1 the Texas Supreme Court adopted part
of Professor Kuntz's solution. Looking to the general intent of the par-
ties, the court concluded that a conveyance encompassing "all minerals"
or specific named substances and "all other minerals" did not contem-
plate destruction of the surface. Instead of ordering compensation when
mining caused surface destruction, however, the court proposed to ex-
clude "near surface minerals" from the mineral estate.20 2
Later, the Texas Supreme Court embraced the second half of Profes-
sor Kuntz's proposal and ceased rearranging ownership of resources. 20 3
Under the new interpretation, any resource that falls under the "ordinary
and natural meaning" of the term "mineral" belongs to the mineral es-
tate.2°4 If removal of the resource destroys the surface, however, dam-
ages must be paid. 205
Several federal statutes creating severed estates have followed the
compensation pattern to reconcile conflicting private interests. For ex-
ample, some homestead acts gave the surface rights to the land to settlers
but allowed the government to grant the mineral estate separately to
other private parties.20 6 These statutes envisaged two distinct usable es-
tates, 20 7 but did not give surface owners the right to veto mineral devel-
opment even if that development would destroy the surface. Rather,
they assured the surface owners of compensation for destruction of sur-
face resources. 208 In addition, some of these acts required mineral own-
201. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
202. Id. at 352; see Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (where an instrument is
construed to the effect that a particular substance lying near the surface belongs to the owner
of a granted surface estate, rather than to the owner of a reserved mineral estate, that particu-
lar substance is not a "mineral" for all purposes of that instrument); Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977). For a sampling of commentary on the Texas approach, see Ferguson,
supra note 145, at 415-17; Kramer, supra note 147, at 69-76; Comment, Lignite: Surface or
Mineral - The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 879 (1977); Note,
Ownership of Unspecified Minerals in Texas and Oklahoma after Reed v. Wylie II, 16 TULSA
L.J. 511 (1981).
203. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). The change in inter-
pretation was applied prospectively only. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Lindholm, 714
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
204. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102. The "ordinary and natural meaning" test may lead to
different results than Professor Kuntz's formulation. It might not include everything that gains
its value from extraction. An earlier Texas case employing this test found that sand, gravel,
and limestone would not be considered minerals unless the deposits were "rare and exceptional
in character or possessed a peculiar character giving them special value." Heinatz v. Allen,
217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Tex. 1949).
205. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102.
206. See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1910, 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1988); Stock-Raising Homestead Act
of 1916 (SRHA), 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988).
207. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 47-51 (1983) (construing SRHA);
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1928) (construing Act of June 22, 1910
and other homesteading acts).
208. See 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988).
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ers to post bonds. After posting a bond the developers could gain access
to the surface over the objections of surface owners. 20 9  More recently,
some oil- and gas-producing states have enacted similar statutes requir-
ing bonds and payment of damages for surface use. These laws reject
earlier laws authorizing use without liability. Although at first glance
they might seem to protect only the surface owner, they can also en-
courage mineral development. 2 10
Other modem statutes regulating mining give an even higher prior-
ity to surface conems. Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977,211 Congress granted an interest in federally reserved
coal to some private owners of overlaying land. The federal coal lessee
may not remove the coal by strip mining without the consent of the sur-
face owner. 212 Several states have enacted similar legislation. 213 Under
these laws, the owner of the surface estate is not merely a servant of the
coal estate, but becomes a joint venturer with the coal estate owner. The
absolute consent requirement allows the surface owner to veto surface
mining of coal or to condition consent to mining on the mineral devel-
oper's agreement to exorbitant demands. By contrast, surface owners
cannot make unreasonable demands of mineral owners under a regime
allowing only court-appraised damages for destruction of the surface
estate.
E. Application of These Models to Interpretation of FLPMA
Each of the models for settling conflicts between surface and min-
eral uses balances the rights of the two estates. The lesson these ap-
proaches teach, which might help interpret FLPMA's unnecessary or
undue degradation standard, is that the dominance of the mineral estate
has withered. The owners of mineral estates, and perhaps other domi-
nant estates, can no longer completely disregard the servient estate.
209. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 85, 1305 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988). See generally Gal-
linger & Arnott, The Rights of Surface Owners Over Federally Reserved Coal as Defined by
Federal Surface Mining Legislation, 1 PuB. LAND L. REV. 57, 58-65 (1980); Miller, supra note
103, at 792-99; Twitty, supra note 148, at 512-25.
210. See generally Hultin, supra note 147, at 1028-41; Polston, supra note 157, at 51-62.
Although initially resisted by oil and gas companies, surface damage acts may assist them
because they give the companies a clear right to enter and drill once they have posted a bond.
Courts have made damages under these acts the surface owner's sole remedy against the lessee.
See, e.g., Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 791 P.2d 821 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990)
(lessee may enter and use surface as reasonably necessary for development of leased minerals);
Turley v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 782 P.2d 130 (Okla. 1989) (surface owner may not protest
increased density of drilling).
211. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
212. Id. § 1304. See generally Gallinger & Arnott, supra note 209, at 65-82.
213. See generally Dycus, supra note 145, at 886-91. The Montana Supreme Court held
that one such statute violated the state constitution. Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co.,
737 P.2d 478 (Mont. 1987). For a critique of efforts to modify the traditional relationship
between surface and mineral estates, see Huffman, supra note 145.
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The accommodation doctrine provides one potential definition for
the phrase "unnecessary or undue" in FLPMA. Under this model, uses
of the public lands would be considered unnecessary if they were not
required to further the primary goal of the private right. Uses would
create both unnecessary and undue degradation if reasonable alternative
means would lessen the impact on the public lands. The private party
would not have a right to proceed by the least expensive method. But a
definition drawn from the accommodation doctrine is not one of even-
handed interest balancing: one estate is identified as dominant. In the
FLPMA context, the private right would be the dominant one.
The flexible doctrine of correlative rights provides an alternative in-
terpretation of the BLM's duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degra-
dation. Under this model, the BLM could forbid the exercise of a private
right that would cause an unreasonably severe impact on other public
land functions. Neither the private right nor public or collective values
would be enthroned as dominant. True balancing could occur. The sys-
tem of reciprocal duties and correlative rights, if applied to the public
lands, could force at least partial forebearance from mineral
development.
Compensation doctrine helps to define "unnecessary and undue deg-
radation" less directly than the other two models. It does not provide a
clear decisional formula. The requirement of consent and the award of
monetary damages, however, further underscore a growing trend of pro-
tecting uses other than the traditionally dominant mineral use. Under
the compensation approach, if other values exceeded the value of mineral
development, the land would not be mined. 21 4 Thus, lands bearing high
surface values would only be disturbed to obtain commensurately high
mineral values.
The BLM currently defines the unnecessary or undue degradation
standard in a manner analogous to the accommodation doctrine, impos-
ing conditions on mineral development only if those conditions do not
make development impractical. 21 5 The legislative history and structure
of FLPMA, however, do not require the BLM to define "unnecessary or
214. Requiring the payment of damages can be a potent protective measure even if damage
awards are not used to restore the surface. Referring to an oil and gas surface damage act, the
Eighth Circuit has noted that:
The requirement that mineral developers compensate surface owners for damage
they cause may well serve as an incentive for developers not to drill... where drilling
is not likely to yield enough oil or gas to justify the loss to the economy from disrup-
tion of surface productivity. The compensation requirement might also create an
incentive for developers to not cause unnecessary surface damage, and to remedy any
damage - avoidable or unavoidable - they may cause.
Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1984); see Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud,
766 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1986).
215. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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undue degradation" in this limited fashion.216 The discussion of legal
doctrines used to reconcile competing private rights demonstrates that
accommodation is not the only feasible model. Under a fully mul-
tidimensional approach, activities could be found to cause "undue" im-
pacts to the public land even if no reasonable alternative means exists to
fulfill the private objective. The gradual increase in judicial and legisla-
tive protection of surface rights in the context of private conflicts sug-
gests that the BLM could legitimately take a stronger approach,
forbidding private activity that would destroy high-value public land re-
sources.217 Under certain circumstances, the BLM could force a mineral
owner to completely forego production.
IV
THE ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDED POWERS
The last section demonstrated that models exist to support the BLM
if it adopted a stronger approach to the unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion standard. Correlative rights doctrine would require an overall bal-
ancing of all resources and interests in the land; collective values would
be as important as private objectives. The question remains, however,
whether adoption of a stronger, correlative rights approach would be de-
sirable. Should the BLM do no more than channel a private project into
the least damaging method, as it does under its current "weak" interpre-
tation of FLPMA? Or do the unique values served by the public lands
justify a more protective stance?
A. The BLM Should Represent Collective Values
Despite the increasing importance attached to protection and pres-
ervation of the public lands in the years before FLPMA's enactment,
FLPMA did not clearly resolve conflicts in favor of environmental pro-
tection. The tensions in FLPMA's mandate are not surprising.
FLPMA, like so much recent legislation, reflects the struggle between
collective and consumer desires. 218 Environmental values are collective.
216. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the legisla-
tive history of FLPMA, see Schwartz, A Capsule Examination of the Legislative History of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 285 (1979).
217. The trend toward greater surface rights also changes mineral owners' reasonable ex-
pectations of developing their subsurface estates. This change could determine the constitu-
tionality of a specific application of the strong definition of unnecessary or undue degradation.
See infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
218. The dichotomy between consumers and citizens is described in Sagoff, supra note 6.
What a person does as an individual consumer may differ from what the same individual may
recognize as being good for society as a whole. An exercise of good citizenship may not coin-
cide with selfish desires. The conflict raises the ethical question "whether we [should] live by
our beliefs or satisfy our interests." Id. at 303. For other descriptions of the dichotomy, see
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979) ("individualistically self-serving activity" of private sphere versus
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As a society, we want to preserve them because they constitute an inte-
gral part of our culture. 219 Nonetheless, both individuals and corpora-
tions within society act as consumers. As such they seek to maximize
tangible returns and may allow economic values to drive their decisions
to the exclusion of "soft" collective values.
220
The BLM must champion the collective values expressed in some
provisions of FLPMA. Without the BLM's advocacy, these values may
be sacrificed in favor of others that appear more valuable in the short
term. First, unlike timber and commodity resources, wilderness and
other environmental values are not readily priced and thus do not lend
themselves to traditional economic analysis. 221 Because other decision-
making criteria are lacking, however, cost-benefit analysis often appeals
to managers who must justify decisions. 222 Second, FLPMA expresses
the policy that the public lands are to be managed "on the basis of multi-
ple use."' 223 Despite hortatory language encouraging environmental pro-
tection in the definition of multiple use,2 2 4  multiple use planning
generally favors uses that are compatible with others, so that particular
parcels of land can support the greatest number of uses.225 Environmen-
"joint and mutual search for good and right answers" of public life); Sax, supra note 6, at 542
("collective versus individualistic values"). But see Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's The-
orem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 343 (all aspects of life provide opportunities for both types of
responses).
219. See Farber, supra note 218, at 357-58 ("Because environmental values are so closely
linked with many other parts of American culture, Americans could excise them only by aban-
doning much that they consider valuable in human life."); see also Wilderness: Past, Present,
and Future, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1989) (symposium issue); cf. Merryman, The Public
Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 339, 341 (1989) ("[C]ultural objects have a
variety of expressive effects that can be described, but not fully captured, in logical terms.").
220. FLPMA allows "soft" values such as environmental protection, which do not have
"hard" monetary equivalents, to battle it out with commodity production. See Sagoff, supra
note 6, at 303-04 (students want mountain undeveloped but also desire to ski on its slopes).
221. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decision-
making, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 194-95 (1980); Teegarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in
National Forest System Planning. Policy, Uses, and Limitations, 17 ENVTL. L. 371, 427 (1987).
222. See Mohai, Rational Decision Making in the Planning Process: Some Empirical Evi-
dence from Rare II, 17 ENVTL. L. 507, 508-19 (1987). NEPA requires that agencies adopt
procedures to "insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical consid-
erations." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). The rules implementing NEPA recognize that cost-benefit
analyses can be useful, but provide caveats:
[The Environmental Impact Statement] shall, when a cost-benefit analysis is pre-
pared, discuss the relationship between that analysis and any analyses of unquantified
environmental impacts, values, and amenities. For purposes of complying with the
Act, the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be
displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when there are im-
portant qualitative considerations.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1990).
223. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1988); see id. § 1712(c)(1) (requiring multiple-use principles
for land-use planning).
224. Id. § 1702(c).
225. P. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE
1991]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
tal considerations, such as wilderness and habitat preservation, are some-
times irreconcilable with commodity development, and thus may be
passed over in a multiple use scheme. 226
A third reason for strong institutional assertion of collective values
is that certain assets, by their very nature, can only be protected by a
central authority. Ecologically sound land management benefits all in a
nonexclusive manner. It is therefore a "public good," 227 requiring gov-
ernmental protection. Because of this need, some would argue, land
must be used in a manner that preserves its natural ecological balance; no
one should have a personal right to modify or destroy that balance.228
Such broad restrictions on use such a rule would entail might be resisted
bitterly if applied to private land holdings. Nevertheless, they could
more easily be imposed on public property.22 9
The public lands belong to both everyone and no one.2 30 More than
any other lands, they are available to serve our collective values, which
include protection of wilderness, wildlife, and the ecological balance.
Privately held acreage is not. as available for these purposes. Most indi-
viduals are unlikely to be willing to relinquish all use of their holdings in
order to preserve land in a natural or wild state. But while we might not
FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 327 (1981). Part of the reason
for this is that multiple use is linked with "sustained yield" management. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701(c)(7), 1712(c)(1) (1988). "Sustained yield" means "the achievement and maintenance
in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable re-
sources of the public lands consistent with multiple use." Id. § 1702(h).
226. Comment, Wilderness Land Preservation: The Uneasy Reconciliation of Multiple and
Single Use Land Management Policies, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 873, 915-16 (1980).
227. Two criteria identify public goods: no individual can provide them individually, and
no person can be excluded from their benefits. National defense is an easily recognized exam-
ple of a public good. Leman & Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of
Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 1002 (1982). Wilderness is another example. Id.; Bab-
bitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Re-
bellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 851-52 (1982). Wilderness, however, also attracts those with an
individualistic perspective. See Huffman, Governing America's Resources in the 1980's, 12
ENVTL. L. 863, 898 (1982) (public ownership of wilderness promotes liberty).
228. See, e.g., Caldwell, Land and Law. Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 319; Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial Protection of the
Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (1988);
Metzger, Private Property and Environmental Sanity, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 793 (1976).
229. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 6, at 541 ("Many people who are enraged at the idea of
federal zoning of private lands are less exercised when the same controls are imposed on pub-
licly owned lands through contract or lease.").
230. This is not to say that no one expresses care and concern over their use. Cf Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (rights of Indians "do
not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land"). Compare Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 711, 712 (1986) ("From this [tragedy of the commons] perspective, 'public property' is
an oxymoron: things left open to the public are not property at all, but rather its antithesis.")
with Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property Rights Evolve, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 373 (plans to sell public lands thwarted by disparate users who "reacted
to the threat as vigorously as would any other private owners").
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forgo building a dream house on our sole personal acre of land, we may
nonetheless agree that open space is necessary and applaud our town's
purchase of a park. 231 Decisions taken as individuals in the private land
market might not reflect a person's recognition of park values. 2
32
B. The Error of Using Private Profit as the Principal Measure
Inevitably, the BLM must choose among conflicting interests in
managing the public lands. Under FLPMA, the BLM has broad man-
agement powers to consider and implement varying concerns and pro-
grams, including such disparate goals as preserving wilderness, fostering
mineral self-sufficiency, and enhancing wildlife habitat.233 The public
lands must provide needed resources, but they must also be available to
satisfy the public need for unspoiled lands. As a guardian of collective
values, the BLM must demand that actions taken upon the lands be envi-
ronmentally sound to ensure that public land values will not be lost
unnecessarily. 234
In order to protect collective environmental values, the BLM must
examine development proposals from a perspective that considers more
than private profit. To focus on profit alone addresses only one half of
the FLPMA land management directive, that is, allowance of activities
"necessary" to private operations. FLPMA also requires the BLM to
prevent "undue" degradation. Activities that involve too great a sacrifice
of collective values for too little societal gain should be considered "un-
due," even if they would provide a private party with a positive economic
return. Thus, even those actions "necessary" to implement a private goal
and employing the least damaging economically feasible method might
create "undue" degradation.
In fact, making economic feasibility the limit of the BLM's control
would allow the most damaging activities to continue. If all profitable
activities must be permitted, a thin potential profit margin could force
231. Cf Sax, supra note 6, at 546 (church might retain rose garden for senior citizen use
when individual would choose to sell it to realize profit).
232. The value people place on parks and other environmental amenities need not be mea-
sured strictly by land prices. Parks may be valued by the time people invest in them. More-
over, certain goods have "existence value;" the simple fact that they exist enriches the
collective consciousness even if they are never used. Wilderness is often identified as a resource
that provides such benefits. See, e.g., Leman & Nelson, supra note 227, at 1002; cf Sax, supra
note 6, at 551-52 (some value arises from the "bandwagon" effect; individuals are more likely
to value wilderness if the community deems it important).
233. Keiter, supra note 66, at 932-33; Mansfield, supra note 9, at 493-94, 498-99.
234. Buttel & Larson, Whither Environmentalism? The Future Political Path of the Envi-
ronmental Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 326 (1980) (because benefits are diffuse,
environment has no natural constituency). But see Wandesforde-Smith, Learning from Experi-
ence, Planning for the Future: Beyond the Parable (and Paradox?) of Environmentalists as Pin-
Striped Pantheists, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 720 (1986) (environmental movement likely to re-
main a powerful political and legal force).
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approval of destructive activities. 235 Even marginal operations, which
can least afford to undertake reclamation or to provide other environ-
mental safeguards, would be allowed to proceed. On the other hand, if
the BLM could prohibit activities that would destroy too many collective
values, developers would bear the cost of environmental protection. Pro-
tection would become a prerequisite for development. Richer mineral
deposits would be more exploitable than marginal ones, because they
would justify the use of more costly protective measures. 236 Moreover,
forcing private actors to pay the costs of destroying public values would
provide incentives for development of new technologies that would per-
mit the achievement of private goals without irreparable damage to pub-
lic resources. 237
C. Role of the Public Trust Doctrine
The suggestion above that the BLM bears a special responsibility to
protect the public values served by the public lands recalls the common
law public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine was developed to pro-
tect navigable waters and the submerged lands that form harbors.238 The
first fiduciary duty imposed on the government by this doctrine was to
preserve navigation routes, an obvious "public" attribute of navigable
waters.239 One central proposition of the doctrine is that the government
has a fiduciary duty to devote certain resources to the common benefit.
This duty may preclude the government from selling these resources or
235. Cf Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) ("To make it commer-
cially impracticable to mine certain coal has very much the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating or destroying it."). Naturally, if mining is prohibited when marginally
profitable at best and this prohibition is deemed to be a taking, little compensation would have
to be paid because of the low value of the property right. Cf Epstein, Takings: Descent and
Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 27 (only minimal compensation required for land de-
stroyed by one flood and likely to be destroyed by another).
236. Additionally, large companies could afford to explore mineral deposits to ascertain
their value without destroying the land's collective environmental values because they could
spread the cost of environmental protection over several projects. For example, Marathon Oil
drilled a wildcat oil and gas well in Shoshone National Forest using helicopter access and
other measures that minimized harm to wildlife and the land. See Park County Resource
Council v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
237. See, e.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 177-86
(1971).
238. See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
239. Hunter, supra note 228, at 377; Rose, supra note 230, at 774-77. Some state cases
impose the public trust on waters that may be subject to appropriation and broaden govern-
mental duties beyond the original thrust, allowing basic environmental concerns to limit own-
ership rights. See generally Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American
Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989); Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 465-70
(1989). See also Gould, supra note 55, at 25-29 to 25-30 (noting that doctrine is shifting to
limit private rights in resources other than public trust resources).
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otherwise foreclosing public access to them. 24° Beyond this, the public
trust doctrine is vague. 241
Under one reading, the public trust doctrine would create a separate
check on the actions of the BLM, imposing a judicially enforceable duty
to protect the collective environmental attributes of the public lands.24
2
The public trust doctrine as developed for navigable waters, however, has
not been transferred to the federal land management context with any
substantive vigor.243 One explanation for this failure is the strong tradi-
tion of transferring these lands and their resources into private hands.
24
In the late 1970's, some cases appeared to adopt a substantive reading of
the doctrine with respect to federal lands, but that movement has been
aborted. 245 Moreover, those cases dealt with the National Park Service,
240. For general background on the public trust doctrine, see The Public Trust and the
Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL. L. (1989) (sympo-
sium issue); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Sympo-
sium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980); Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.
631, 643 n.75, 644 n.76 (1986).
241. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern
View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 579 (1989) ("public trust doctrine is
chameleon-like, depending on the context at hand"); Rose, supra note 230, at 722 (public trust
doctrine is " 'flexible' in response to 'changing public needs' ").
242. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 509, 521 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Trust 1] (doctrine not
necessarily substantive but a strong "technique" for judicial review); Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 185, 192-93 (1980) [here-
inafter Sax, Trust II] (substantive dimension of the public trust doctrine should be recognized).
243. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (lands under
navigable waters distinguished from "public lands which are open to preemption and sale").
244. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
269, 273, 276 (1980); see Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its
Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
135, 152-53 (1972).
245. In Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, the district court held that an enforceable
public trust duty arising both from common law and statutory sources could preclude logging
adjacent to Redwood National Park. 376 F. Supp. 90, 93-96 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see Keiter, On
Protecting the National Parks from the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 355, 374 (1984) (Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior is first instance of judicial imposition of
public trust duty in national parks context). In later proceedings arising from this dispute, the
statute's commands overshadowed any common law trust duty. See Sierra Club v. Andrus,
487 F. Supp. 443 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659
F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
There has been considerable debate about whether the 1978 amendments to the National
Parks Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 166 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1988)),
created a statutory public trust responsibility applicable to the Park Service that would require
it to regulate activity outside parks. Compare Keiter, supra, at 369-75 (affirmative duty to
combat external threats to park resources) with Coggins, supra note 66, at 16-17 (evidence that
statutes require action outside parks tenuous and balanced by language about protecting wild-
life in parks). Keiter subsequently acknowledged that courts hesitate to impose a duty to
combat external threats on government land management agencies. Keiter, supra note 66, at
949-50.
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which has a clearer statutory directive to maintain the environmental
values of the lands under its control than does the BLM.246
With respect to public lands management by the BLM, the public
trust concept does not have independent life as a source of enforceable
duties. 247 The public trust doctrine, however, can help interpret the
breadth of the BLM's powers in managing the public lands. Although
the doctrine does not mandate particular actions in the public lands con-
text, the rationale that gave rise to the public trust doctrine supports a
strong reading of the duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.
Some cases dealing with public land in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries did refer to those lands as being held by the govern-
ment "in trust" for the people of the United States.248 The term "trust"
was not, however, used in the same sense as in the classic public trust
doctrine developed with respect to land under navigable waters. Under
the classic doctrine, public trust property or access to its resources was to
be kept indefinitely in common ownership. 249 This was not so with re-
spect to the public lands. The public lands were eventually to be disposed
of,250 but they had to be protected while held by the government, and
could be disposed of only as Congress dictated. 251  No trespasses nor
fraudulent acquisitions could be allowed. The Secretary of the Interior's
246. See generally Lemons & Stout, A Reinterpretation of National Park Legislation, 15
ENVTL. L. 41 (1984) (tension arises between requirements to preserve parks unimpaired and to
provide for public use and enjoyment, but Park Service's basic duty is to preserve).
247. See Mansfield, supra note 9, at 490-502; Wilkinson, supra note 52, at 26-28 (applica-
bility of public trust doctrine to public lands uncertain and unsupported by case law); Wilkin-
son, supra note 244, at 276-77 (public trust doctrine not unsuited for application to public
lands). But see Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (imposing trust-like
duties on BLM). It has been suggested that the public trust doctrine is not an effective means
of protecting environmental values. Comment, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law:
Ineffective - And Undesirable - Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 457 (1982)
(environmentalists should seek more detailed statutory standards and participate in agency
decisionmaking rather than rely on the "sham" public trust doctrine).
248. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 177-82 (1891); Buford v. Houtz,
133 U.S. 320 (1890); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888); see also Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
249. A recent case distilled three principles from prior law:
First, courts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender valuable public
resources to a private entity. Second, the public trust is violated when the primary
purpose of a legislative grant is to benefit a private interest. Finally, any attempt by
the state to relinquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated under
the doctrine.
Lake Michigan Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F. Supp. 441, 445 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (citations omitted).
250. See supra notes 17, 20-21 and accompanying text.
251. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring):
The United States holds its resources in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in
the sense that a private trustee holds for a cestui que trust. The responsibility of
Congress is to utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way that
it decides is best for the future of the Nation.
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representatives were considered "trustees or guardians of lands under
their jurisdiction. '252
The concept of holding lands in trust increased federal power under
the property clause and strengthened congressional authority to delegate
that power to agencies. In an era of strict substantive due process and
restrained delegation of legislative powers, the trust analogy provided a
shorthand for an unusual deference accorded to congressional decisions
regarding public lands. For example, in one case a court looked to the
trust concept in upholding a trespass action for allowing cattle to graze
on National Forest land despite a state law that precluded a trespass
action unless the landowner had fenced out cattle.25 3 Judicial declara-
tion of a federal trust responsibility did not allow courts to second-guess
agencies; rather, it increased the power of both agencies and Congress
with respect to management of the public lands.254
This historical application of a "public trust" concept to public
lands can supply content to the congressional command to "take any
action necessary to prevent unnecessary. or undue degradation of the
lands. ' 255 The trust analysis supports a more powerful interpretation of
the BLM's mandate to protect collective values than the weak interpreta-
tion currently followed by the BLM. In requiring the BLM to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation, Congress may have been exercising
its full trust powers and therefore may have intended to authorize all
measures necessary to protect the public lands.25 6 Under this interpreta-
252. Knight, 142 U.S. at 161; see Beebe, 127 U.S. at 342.
253. Light, 220 U.S. at 537:
All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole coun-
try. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is
for Congress to determine. The courts cannot compel it to set aside the lands for
settlement, or to suffer them to be used for agricultural purposes or grazing purposes,
nor interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress establishes a forest re-
serve for what it decides to be national and public purposes.
See also United States v Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1910) (Congress may delegate authority
to regulate uses of forest reserves). For commentary, see Engdahl, supra note 52, at 309 (inter-
preting Grimaud to approve delegation of proprietary powers under the Property Clause with-
out the stricter standards required for delegation of other powers); Sullivan, supra note 52, at
97 (emphasizing that Light, which deferred to Congress, was decided during the heyday of
restrictive interpretations of delegation).
254. For similar conclusions see, for example, Montgomery, supra note 244, at 159-60;
Wilkinson, supra note 244, at 280-84; Comment, supra note 247, at 476-80; Note, Protecting
National Parks From Developments Beyond Their Borders, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1197-
1201 (1984).
255. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1988).
256. See Getches, supra note 98, at 334 (public trust fills interstices of protective statutes);
Wilkinson, supra note 52, at 35-38 (public trust resolves ambiguity in congressional legisla-
tion); Wilkinson, supra note 244, at 311-13 (public trust useful for statutory construction); cf
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (in interpret-
ing state action, start with premise that state would not ordinarily intend to lessen public use
when it disposes of public land). This view of the public trust as an interpretive guide and
supplement to legislation is not inconsistent with the view that the public trust doctrine cannot
substantively restrain congressional decisionmaking. See, e.g., Tarlock, Book Review, 34
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tion, rather than simply seeking "accommodation" between collective
values and private projects, the BLM could favor preservation of public
land values over fulfillment of private purposes in some circumstances.
The trust concept would not, however, require that the BLM always
place environmental values above others. 257
V
IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY
FLPMA allows the BLM considerable discretion in managing the
public lands. Because FLPMA does not direct the BLM to favor any one
type of interest, the agency may balance conflicting interests that affect
particular parcels of land. Thus, the BLM could, and should, adopt a
stronger interpretation of FLPMA's unnecessary or undue degradation
standard. Under a strong interpretation of the standard, an activity
could be prohibited as "unduly degrading" if it would cause excessive
environmental harm or preclude an inordinate number of alternative uses
of the public lands. The BLM should follow the model not of accommo-
dation, which enshrines one interest as dominant, but rather of balancing
correlative rights.
In accordance with this balancing approach, the BLM should not
condemn an activity such as a mine or a road without also looking at its
potential benefits. Straight cost-benefit analysis, which compares mone-
tizable costs and benefits, should not be the only form of analysis.
258
Such an analysis may be helpful in comparing the results of competing
development proposals, but is less appropriate in comparing a develop-
ment proposal with the option of preserving environmental amenities.
The difficulty of expressing certain values in monetary terms may skew
the results of cost-benefit analysis in favor of proposals that will produce
readily monetized benefits and less readily monetized costs. 259 This
skewing will tend, for example, to favor mineral development over envi-
ronmental preservation.
STAN. L. REV. 255, 268 (1981). The public trust doctrine, as a gap filler, would not limit
Congress' choices, but merely would guide courts when Congress has not made its intentions
explicit.
257. See Sax, Trust I, supra note 242, at 482 (government may accommodate new needs by
reallocating resources even if property subject to public trust); Sax, Trust II supra note 242, at
186 (public trust doctrine not rigid prohibition of change in land use); Wilkinson, supra note
244, at 307-10 (notion of disposing of public lands probably too ingrained in Property Clause
for public trust to restrain Congress, even if doctrine is based in the constitution).
258. See, e.g., Coggins, supra note 22, at 20-23 (economic efficiency cannot be basis of
public land law philosophy).
259. Rodgers, supra note 221, at 194-200; Teegarden, supra note 221, at 426-27; cf Ohio v.
Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (regulations restricting natural re-
source damages under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act to lesser of restoration cost or value
of lost use alone held contrary to congressional intent); Colorado v. Dep't of the Interior, 880
F.2d 481, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same).
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Numerical cost-benefit analysis may also mask value judgments be-
hind a cloak of scientific respectability. 26° Methods exist for assigning
monetary values to environmental amenities, but their validity is ques-
tionable.261 Nevertheless, in the absence of other decisional frameworks,
this type of analysis receives credence as justification for decisions. It
bolsters a claim of neutrality, but absolute neutrality is neither possible
nor desirable for the BLM. Inevitably, managing the public lands re-
quires value judgments. 262 The BLM should accept this truth and make
its value judgments openly so all will know the basis of its choices.
Before making such choices, the BLM should fully hear the argu-
ments in favor of differing allocative choices.263 Because the BLM must
resolve conflicting demands without firm guidance from Congress, the
interest representation model of administrative law is especially suited to
its resource allocation decisions.264 Allowing all affected parties to par-
ticipate ensures that all values are spoken for, broadens the BLM's infor-
mation base, and provides the representation without which laws should
not be made in a democracy. 265 The BLM's eventual decision should
promote what it determines to be the public interest. Making this deter-
mination requires the agency to exercise independent judgment, rather
than simply summing the "votes" of interested persons.266 In some
cases, this process will lead to the conclusion that development should be
halted or greatly modified, but in other situations development will be
allowed to proceed.
The conflicts caused by privately owned mineral estates beneath
public lands illustrate the decisionmaking process the BLM should go
260. Rodgers, supra note 221, at 226.
261. d'Arge, A Practical Guide to Economic Valuation of the Natural Environment, 35
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-1, 5-5 (1989) (there are major conceptual and practical
problems in identifying accurate and meaningful prices for nonmarket goods); cf Farber, supra
note 218, at 358 (rather than attempting to justify environmental values rationally, we should
accept that they are at least in part emotional).
262. Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 402 (1962) (value
choices occur despite myth that planning decisions are objective).
263. The interest representation model of administrative law requires such agency open-
ness to public input. Professor Stewart was the first to note that many agencies had come to
resemble mini-legislatures, and that a primary goal of administrative law should be to assure
representation of all interests in this new forum. Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975).
264. See generally Mansfield, supra note 9, at 503-20 (evaluating usefulness of applying
interest representation model to BLM).
265. Id. at 513-14.
266. See Coggins, supra note 22, at 24-26 (although the public interest is an elusive and
changing standard, the search for it is crucial to good government). Agencies, however, tend
to regard the "public interest" as being served by accommodating the desires of those demand-
ing attention, rather than looking beyond the goals of these parties. P. CULHANE, supra note
225, at 208-31. See generally Reich, supra note 262, at 387-92 (lack of input from general
public, as opposed to interest groups, in forest management decisionmaking); Sunstein, Fac-
tions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986).
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through. In response to the mineral owner's proposal to undertake de-
velopment, representatives of a number of interests will converge on the
BLM District Manager's office. Ranchers may complain that the min-
eral development will cause loss of forage. Hunters may claim that min-
ing will disrupt winter range essential to the deer population. Other
wildlife advocates may point to the area's ecological importance for non-
game species. In addition, the site of the proposed development may be
exceptionally beautiful, and those who enjoy that beauty may seek to
protect it. The District Manager will consider all of these values in de-
ciding whether to forbid the project or restrict it to some extent. No
hard-and-fast rules can structure these decisions because they ultimately
require reconciling the irreconcilable. The BLM must exercise its discre-
tion in each individual setting without relying upon a rigid framework.
267
Some guidelines, however, can be formulated. The "strong" inter-
pretation of the FLPMA mandate proposed in this Article would not
require the BLM to halt all activities that disturb resources on the public
lands or which are incompatible with other uses. Only those private en-
terprises that threaten core public values should be curbed.268 These val-
ues include recreational activities and protection of wilderness,
watershed, and wildlife. Moreover, development need not be foreclosed
even if it threatens these or other public land functions. The public bene-
fits from the activity, such as jobs and independence from reliance on
foreign sources of minerals, must enter the equation. In some instances,
the gains from development will justify the loss of environmental values.
Therefore, the BLM should evaluate "unnecessary or undue degra-
dation" on a sliding scale. The relative scarcity of both the mineral re-
sources and threatened collective resources should influence the decision.
For example, development of a particularly rare or major mineral deposit
could justify more damage to other resources than smaller or more com-
mon deposits. Conversely, lands serving major ecological or recreational
interests could demand more vigorous preservation than other public
lands. Ultimately, private activities should be precluded only if they
would affect public lands that provide significant collective benefits. This
requirement would provide an element of fairness. In essence, the excep-
tional beauty, wildlife, or ecological importance of the lands would put
267. Discretion, in and of itself, is not necessarily an evil. BLM personnel can provide
crucial professional knowledge and initiative. Congress lacks the time and expertise to define
national policy completely or to manage each acre of the public lands. Therefore, it must
delegate some discretion to administrative agencies such as the BLM. Mansfield, supra note 9,
at 496-97.
268. Cf Freyogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1529, 1553-56 (1989) (should restructure property rights in water not on a wholesale
basis, but only to preserve things that society values); Gaetke, supra note 55, at 183 (land
management agencies should regulate activity beyond the borders of their lands only when
imperative to preserve congressional policy).
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the developer on notice that development could be restricted in order to
preserve these values.
Recognition of the BLM's authority to forbid private activities
would not be an unqualified defeat for mineral interests or other develop-
ers. In exercising this authority, the BLM would be allowed to consider
the appropriateness of placing environmental concerns above all other
values. If, after this type of review, the BLM decided to allow an activ-
ity, that decision should be accorded greater judicial deference than one
in which the agency approved the activity simply because it lacked the
power to forbid it. Thus environmentalists may gain greater protection
of the resources they value, but mineral owners in return will enjoy
greater certainty that decisions favorable to them will not be overturned.
To a large extent, the BLM's decisions are, and would continue to
be, insulated from substantive judicial review. 269 Judicial deference to
the BLM's decisions is not necessarily undesirable. This deference allows
the BLM to assess activities within the framework of its overall land
management regime, rather than limiting its focus to the particular par-
cel of public land on which the activity would occur.270 So long as it
provides all interested parties with access to the decisionmaking process,
the BLM, rather than the federal judiciary, is the appropriate body to
make decisions about public land management. 271
269. Mansfield, supra note 9, at 494-97.
270. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1003 (D. Utah 1979). Too little judicial deference
to agency decisions can lead to the narrow view that has led one commentator to call judicial
allocation of resources under the public trust doctrine "undemocratic." Gould, supra note 55,
at 25-47 to 25-49. As Gould states:
The inevitable trade-offs and important social and economic issues which resource
allocation policies must resolve require broad input.... Lawsuits limit the input to
that provided by the parties before the court . . . [and] the issues are likely to be
considered only in the context of the dispute before the court.... [A] legislative or
administrative body might balance environmental losses in one place against environ-
mental gains elsewhere in attempting to achieve a balanced, rational result.
Id. at 25-48 to 25-49. For a similar view see Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges:
A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, and Johnson,
63 DEN. U.L. REV. 565 (1986); Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of
Public Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 171, 208-10 (1987). For a contrary view see Blumm, supra note 241 (lively
response to Huffman).
271. Courts should not defer completely to agency decisions. They must ensure that deci-
sions have been made rationally, using the agency's professional expertise. The basic review
standard under the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to overturn arbitrary and
capricious actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). While fixing the appropriate level of judicial
review is beyond the scope of this Article, there can be no meaningful review if the "arbitrary
and capricious" test insulates the agency from criticism for unexplained and unexplainable
choices. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (N.D. Wash. 1989) (re-
jecting agency decision that, without explanation, ignored expert opinions). The courts must
seek a middle ground between total deference to and total distrust of agency actions. See
Benfield, The Administrative Record and The Range of Alternatives in National Forest Plan-
ning: Applicable Standards and Inconsistent Approaches, 17 ENVTL. L. 371, 375 (1987) (arbi-




THE REGULATORY TAKING ISSUE
A. Constitutional Contours
The Fifth Amendment provides that no "private property [shall] be
taken for public use without just compensation. '272 Any acquisition of
title, and almost any physical occupation, triggers this clause.273 Ac-
cording to some cases, a regulation restricting the use of private property
may also constitute a taking for which the government must provide
compensation if it imposes an extreme burden on the landowner. 274
No firm test determines when a regulatory taking occurs. 275 Two
themes, however, run through regulatory takings cases. First, certain
government purposes can validate even regulations that greatly impede
private activity.276 Regulations directed at preserving important collec-
tive values are more likely to withstand a takings challenge than regula-
tions not serving such a strong public purpose.
Second, the degree of interference with the landowner's reasonable
expectations may determine whether a particular regulation amounts to a
"minimal factual support and reasonableness"). Compare Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803,
807 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1979) (agency's methods found "irrational" upon showing "that there is
virtually no evidence in the record to support the agency's methodology") with Hinsdale Live-
stock Co. v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 773, 777 (D. Mont. 1980) (court effectively gave
greater deference to ranchers' view than to agency's).
272. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A
Decisional Model for The Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). To be upheld, a regulation also must be a valid exercise of
governmental power. Prohibition of development such as mining would be valid under the
Property Clause and FLPMA, provided that the BLM was not arbitrary and capricious in its
analysis of the harms and benefits from the proposed development.
273. Recent cases suggest that any permanent physical occupation, no matter how mini-
mal its effect on the landowner, may be a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430-35 (1982); see also Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1603 (1988) (courts moving toward per se rules of what constitutes a taking). But
see PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1979) (temporary entry into
shopping center literal but not constitutional taking); Costonis, supra note 272, at 511 (Loretto
aberrational).
274. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule... is
that, while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."). But see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887): "A prohibi-
tion simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit." These potentially
inconsistent positions thread through takings jurisprudence. They are not, however, irrecon-
cilable. The strength of the police power justifying the regulation distinguishes the two lines of
cases. See generally Mansfield, Regulatory Takings, Expectations, and Valid Existing Rights 5
J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 431, 444-45 (1990).
275. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977) (cases are
decided on the basis of ad hoc factual inquiries rather than on any set formula).
276. Regulations abating nuisances, protecting core economic values, or creating a reci-
procity of advantage are typically upheld. Mansfield, supra note 274, at 440-46.
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taking requiring the payment of compensation. 277 This expectation com-
ponent of takings analysis harks back to Bentham's definition of property
as the expectation of deriving advantage from control over a thing.
278 It
also reflects Blackstone's recognition that the law limits individual do-
minion over property.279 The expectation measure is qualitative rather
than quantitative. As one commentator explained, the old "diminution
of value" test280 was similarly qualitative:
[T]he test poses not so loose a question of degree; it does not ask 'how
much,' but rather ... it asks 'whether or not': Whether or not the mea-
sure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claim-
ant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed
expectation. 281
A recent Supreme Court case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v.
DeBenedictis,282 applied these two concepts to determine whether a regu-
latory taking had occurred. The facts of Keystone were nearly identical
to those of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,28 3 decided more than sixty
years earlier. Both cases involved challenges by owners of severed min-
eral estates to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania statutes that prohib-
ited coal mining that could cause surface subsidence under private
residences. 284 The earlier case invalidated the regulation, holding that it
was an unconstitutional taking without compensation because it was not
authorized by the state's police power. 28 5 By contrast, in the later case
the Court ruled that no taking had occurred.
286
Keystone, however, did not explicitly overrule Pennsylvania Coal.
Instead, the Keystone majority distinguished the earlier case on two
grounds. First, the Keystone Court took a different view of the property
277. Compare Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (government
consent to dredging raised property owner's expectation of right to exclude others from
dredged area) and Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122-23 (D. Nev. 1989) (right to water
cattle at well a distinct investment-backed expectation) with United States v. Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 704-05 (1987) (no taking of riverbed interests if U.S. exercises
right to improve navigation because property owner holds property subject to navigation servi-
tude) and United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 489, 494 (1978) (government need not com-
pensate for value added to property by grazing permits because statute specifies that they
"shall not create any right.., in or to the lands"). The Supreme Court has recognized some
expectations not backed by monetary investment, such as the expectation of passing property
to one's heirs. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987). Such transferability is a strong
component of the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual property rights.
278. See supra text accompanying note 3.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
280. This was the test used, for example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922).
281. Michelman, supra note 272, at 1233.
282. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
283. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
284. Compare id. at 412 with Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478.
285. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
286. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501-02.
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affected by the regulation. Pennsylvania Coal construed the interest af-
fected as the right to mine coal without liability for surface subsidence,
and the regulation extinguished the coal company's negative easement in
the surface.287 The Keystone Court not only refused to take this narrow
view but also declined to divide the coal estate into individual tonnage.
The Court instead asked whether the regulation left the mineral-produc-
ing property uneconomical "as a whole," taking into account all the min-
ing operations of the complaining companies. 288 This broad view made
the regulation appear to interfere less with the mining companies' expec-
tations, thereby reducing the need for compensation. 289
The Keystone majority also found the public purpose behind the
later statute clearer 290 despite the fact that, as the dissent pointed out, the
purposes of the two statutes were virtually identical. 291 Acknowledging
the similarities between the statutes, however, does not necessarily un-
dermine the majority's result. Societal perceptions of the problems ad-
dressed by a statute may be more important than the literal wording of
the statute's purpose clauses.292 Changes in the social context within
which the statutes were interpreted apparently swayed the Keystone ma-
287. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 ("To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect ... as appropriating or destroying it."); see Cos-
tonis, supra note 272, at 536 n.291 (statute in Pennsylvania Coal physically invaded property
because it extinguished a negative easement; true regulatory taking cases involve mere im-
pingement on landowner's fee interest).
288. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496 ("We do know, however, that petitioners have never
claimed that their mining operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since
the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location...
has been unprofitable."). The dissenters refused to adopt this broad view. Id. at 517-28
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This dispute continues the battle begun in Pennsylvania Coal be-
tween Brandeis and Holmes. Rehnquist has taken up the Holmesian banner of conceptual
severance, which considers each stick in the bundle of property rights individually. Another
case, Hodel v. Irving, also reflects this tendency toward conceptual severance. 481 U.S. 704
(1987). Irving, however, presented an unusual opportunity to engage in conceptual severance.
The challenged statute provided that existing small undivided interests could no longer pass by
devise or descent but would escheat to the tribe to consolidate title. Id. at 709.
289. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97. The Keystone language broadly referring to the prop-
erty as all coal the party controls may allow for courts to distinguish between affected compa-
nies. In some circumstances, drawing such distinctions could be desirable, allowing the
government to avoid imposing disproportionate harm on individuals, without overtaxing the
public fisc. For example, compensation may be appropriate for a mineral owner who is unable
to spread the cost of regulation across multiple mineral holdings, but not for an owner with
many similar mineral holdings, only some of which are affected by the regulation. Mansfield,
supra note 274, at 461-65.
290. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492 (statute prohibited actions whose effect would be similar to
public nuisance). But see Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 580 (rejecting arguments for broad public purpose and character-
izing the law as redistributive).
291. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
292. For example, in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes apparently saw the case simply as a dis-
pute between one family and a coal company, while Brandeis envisioned the City of Scranton
sliding into a gaping hole. Compare Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 with id. at 421-22
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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jority. The growth of public concern for environmental protection since
the 1920's allowed the Court to view the modern statute as serving a
stronger public purpose. 293
A comparison of Keystone to another case decided during the same
term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 294 further emphasizes the
importance of regulatory objectives in takings analysis. In Nollan, the
California Coastal Commission had required a property owner to provide
public access across a private beach in order to obtain a building permit.
The Court invalidated this requirement as an unconstitutional taking be-
cause the condition imposed was not sufficiently related to the asserted
governmental purpose.295 A distinction between Nollan and Keystone
that contributed to their different outcomes is that Nollan dealt with a
discrete easement which could readily be purchased, 296 whereas Keystone
dealt with both diffuse harm and diffuse benefits.
297
Although the Keystone majority left the description of the regula-
tory takings test undisturbed, the opinion does not simply endorse prior
judicial analysis. Keystone sanctioned a regulation virtually identical to
one that an earlier court had disallowed. The Keystone decision demon-
strates that even a burdensome regulation, if clearly aimed at preventing
activity that would degrade the environment, can survive a takings
challenge. 298
B. Unnecessary or Undue Degradation and Compensation
Takings analysis can be used to examine whether the BLM can reg-
ulate private activity in such a manner as to make a private right unex-
ercisable.299 The BLM could reasonably find that the exercise of many
293. Note, Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 185,
192 (1988) (arguing that growth in concern for environment tipped balance in favor of public
over private use).
294. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
295. Id. at 837. Nollan was not an ordinary regulatory taking case. For a full discussion
of this case and the three circumstances that distinguish it from more typical regulatory set-
tings, see Mansfield, supra note 274, at 451-52 (involved a physical intrusion, affected a resi-
dence, and resembled compulsory land dedication). The Court required more than a
reasonable relationship to a valid government purpose; it required a clear nexus between the
evil to be avoided and the land use restraint imposed. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
296. See Costonis, supra note 272, at 500-01 (measures that impose obligations akin to
affirmative easements always troublesome to courts).
297. When benefits are diffuse, the government must act to protect "public rights." Sax,
supra note 237, at 159. Diffusion of benefits and costs also increases the transaction costs of
purchasing the private right. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Prop-
erty Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 31-32, 44 (1985).
298. See Laitos, Regulation of Natural Resources Use and Development in Light of the
'New' Takings Clause, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-37 (1988) (Keystone takes nui-
sance exception to extreme and could render land use and environmental regulations immune
to challenge).
299. This examination presupposes that any BLM decision limiting activity could survive
a meaningful "arbitrary or capricious" test. See Plater & Norine, Through the Looking Glass
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types of private rights would cause unnecessary or undue degradation in
particular circumstances. Such a finding would be appropriate whenever
substantial evidence showed that the gains from a private activity would
not justify the destruction of other resource values that the activity
would cause. Regulated activities could be as diverse as summer cabins,
roads, or timber harvests. This Article, however, will continue to focus
on a severed mineral estate.
Two different theories could support the imposition of restrictions
on mineral development without payment of compensation. First, the
BLM could assert that the private interest was subject to a "collective
protection" servitude in favor of the public lands. This approach is
briefly discussed below. Because it would represent a radical departure
from current property law, the BLM is not likely to adopt this approach
nor would it be appropriate. The second, more feasible approach would
be to argue that the limited nature of the mineral owner's investment-
backed expectations precludes a finding that restricting mineral develop-
ment constitutes a taking. This approach, together with the argument
that BLM control of the particular activity serves a strong public pur-
pose, would place the analysis within existing regulatory takings
jurisprudence.
1. Imposition of a "Collective Protection" Servitude Would Be
Inappropriate
The FLPMA command to prevent unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the public lands perhaps could be stretched into a declaration that
a private property interest never includes the right to interfere with im-
portant public land values. Under this interpretation, the government
would hold a type of servitude on behalf of the public lands. This servi-
tude would define the rights of private owners of property adjacent to the
public lands and justify the imposition of restraints on the use of such
private property, so long as those restraints were reasonably related to
preserving collective values. Because the private party would never have
"owned" the right to degrade the public lands, regulations designed to
-prevent degradation would not take any property.
Such a servitude could resemble the navigation servitude, under
which the United States has jurisdiction to control the use of navigable
waters for power and navigational purposes. No owner of riparian or
submerged lands may object if the government acts pursuant to this
right.3° ° A collective protection servitude similarly would allow protec-
of Eminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rational-
ity Review of Government Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661 (1989).
300. See, e.g., United Stated v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 704-05
(1987). See generally Morreale, Federal Powers on Western Waters: The Navigation Power and
the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1963); Note, Determining the Parame-
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tion and promotion of public values to override private property rights.
Like a public trust limitation on use, this servitude would be self-execut-
ing, restricting private expectations even in the absence of agency ac-
tion. 30' In essence, the servitude would place special emphasis on the
public's expectation that the collective values served by the public lands
will be maintained. 30 2
Despite growing recognition that all individuals bear some responsi-
bility for stewardship of the land,303 a collective-protection servitude is
not likely to be adopted in a form that would foreclose the sole viable use
of private land. The implementation of new restraints on private rights
generally proceeds by evolutionary, not revolutionary, steps.3°4 Environ-
mental awareness is not yet so strong that society would be willing to
automatically forbid all activity that might degrade public land values
without weighing this protection against other factors. 30 5 The BLM
must only foreclose development following a site-specific analysis.
ters of the Navigation Servitude Doctrine, 34 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1981).
301. See Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990) (revo-
cation of permit to use lands which are subject to public trust does not constitute a taking);
Orion Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641-42, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987) (because
right to dredge and fill tidelands never existed, statute forbidding dredging and filling could not
"take" property); Walston, The Public Trust and Water Rights: National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 701, 709-10 (1987). For criticism of the Orion
case, see Gould, supra note 55. See also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989)
(expansion of public trust limitations requires compensation of landowner).
302. Cf Sax, Trust II, supra note 242, at 186-87 (concern for expectations traditionally
confined to private owners but should not be so limited). But see Huffman, A Fish Out of
Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 529 n. 10
(1989) (Sax ignores distinction between legally cognizable expectations and other
expectations).
303. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972); Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a
"Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1989); Berger, The Accom-
modation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
798, 811, 823 (1976); Caldwell, supra note 228, at 335; Hunter, supra note 228, at 317-20;
Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1723 (1988); cf
Freyogle, supra note 268, at 1531, 1548-53 (property law should, like water law, be based on
rights phrased in terms of responsibility and accommodation); Sax, The Limits of Private
Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 475 (1989) (no private right can denigrate public
interest).
304. As Professor Stoebuck has pointed out: "Of course the law changes and grows; adapt-
ability is the genius of the common law. But the process is erosion, not earthquake; one can
safely put a little new wine in old bottles if it is mixed sparingly with old." Stoebuck, Police
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1080 (1980).
305. Another problem with the imposition of such a servitude is that it could potentially
eviscerate the Fifth Amendment. Huffman, supra note 270, at 212; Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1108 (1981); see Anderson, supra note




2. Preclusion of Mining May Not Constitute a Taking
Under the "strong" interpretation of the unnecessary and undue
degradation standard the BLM could promulgate regulations that would
allow it, in an appropriate circumstance, to render a decision that would
preclude private development. A BLM decision entirely forbidding the
development of a private mineral estate would not constitute a taking
requiring payment of compensation because of the nature of both the
public purpose and the private party's expectations.
First, a decision made under the "strong interpretation would serve
an important public purpose. Historically, despite the lack of a preexist-
ing servitude preserving public lands, courts have more closely scruti-
nized actions that impinge on core collective values than other actions.
As a result, the exercise of private rights that threaten such values re-
ceives less judicial protection in the context of a regulatory takings chal-
lenge.3°6 Furthermore, because the BLM would render such a decision
only after a site-specific balancing of collective and private values, the
public purpose served by the adjudication would be more evident than
that of a general regulation aimed at environmental protection. A regula-
tion by definition looks at overall impacts without appraising special con-
siderations. By contrast, the BLM would consider the specific costs and
benefits of the proposed project in rendering its decision to forbid
mining.307
Second, the developer's expectations must take into account the rec-
ognized need to regulate mining in order to protect the environment.
The limited nature of the mineral owner's investment-backed expecta-
tions could preclude a finding that restrictions imposed on mineral devel-
opment constitute a taking. The road toward responsible land use,
therefore, begins with existing regulations, which already limit invest-
ment-backed expectations. Thus, under traditional takings doctrine the
BLM may have the authority to curb private uses that threaten collective
public land values; courts need not take the revolutionary step of impos-
ing a collective-protection servitude on private property.
For many courts and commentators, disruption of a property
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations has become the sine
qua non of a taking.30 8 Obviously, if this is the test, the BLM's ability to
306. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-80 (1928) (owners of cedar trees not
entitled to compensation when trees destroyed to preserve commercial apple orchards vital to
the economy).
307. Compare the Administative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988) (rulemaking)
with id. § 551(6), (7), (8) (adjudication). Because appraisal of a specific development proposal
in an adjudicatory setting involves neither "withdrawing" public lands nor making a manage-
ment decision precluding a "principal or major use" of the public lands, see 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(j), (1) (1988), the BLM need not follow the special procedures applicable to these deci-
sions. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e), 1714 (1988).
308. See, e.g., Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979).
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impose restrictions on the exercise of private rights depends on the rea-
sonableness of private expectations of development.
In all circumstances, including mining, the outcome of the expecta-
tions test may depend on whether development is ongoing or merely
planned when a restriction is imposed. Once development has begun, the
public has a lesser expectation that the land will remain undisturbed.
The mineral owner, on the other hand, has more reason to believe devel-
opment is permissible. Moreover, once mining has begun the owner has
made an objectively verifiable investment in a specific land use, with the
expectation that the use will be allowed to continue. 3°9 Imposition of
new regulations on land held in anticipation of future development may
also disrupt expectations, but these expectations ard less concrete. 310
Moreover, a court may characterize these expectations as merely specu-
lative and entitled to less protection because speculators take the risk that
future events may make development less profitable.311 Thus, while reg-
ulations may, in some circumstances, restrict existing uses, such uses
tend to receive more deference from courts than anticipated future devel-
opment. 31 2 The anticipation of yet unrealized profit is one of the least
protected aspects of property ownership. The Supreme Court has stated
that: "prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned specu-
lation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, per-
haps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has
traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related
interests. ' 3 13 Therefore, public needs may justify regulations that restrict
future profitability, despite the fact that the power to profit is "a right
usually incident to fortunately situated property. 314
The existing regulatory climate also affects a mineral owner's rea-
sonable expectations. If a person acquires property knowing that certain
309. See Michelman, supra note 272, at 1233; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 169,
176-78 (1979) (private party would not have created harbor unless it believed it could recoup
expenditure by controlling access).
310. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (public trust imposed on unfilled tracts but not on
tracts which have already been filled).
311. Izaak Walton League v. St. Claire, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (failure to develop for
many years showed speculative nature of mineral holdings).
312. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-27 (1977);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
see also Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1004 (government may regulate more stringently when
no current use affected); St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York, 728 F. Supp. 958, 966
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (law contemplates continuation of past use).
313. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 54-60 (1964) (Fifth Amendment compensation designed to prevent tyranny, not
to protect existing economic advantage). But see Stoebuck, supra note 304, at 1075-77 (Sax
criticized for not recognizing that the "tyranny" the amendment seeks to prevent is destruc-
tion of property rights; amendment therefore designed to protect existing property rights).
314. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
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restraints are imminent, the imposition of these restraints should not re-
quire compensation. 315 Nor should compensation be necessary for prop-
erty acquired at a time when regulations precluded profitable
development. In such a case, the purchaser is simply gambling on pay-
ment from the government, rather than intending or reasonably expect-
ing to develop the property. 3 16
FLPMA is part of the regulatory climate and its passage put poten-
tial developers on notice that regulations might be imposed on activities
undertaken on or near the public lands. People who acquired their rights
before enactment of FLPMA may have had stronger expectations that
they would be allowed to use their property as they saw fit. Thus, limita-
tion of their property rights may require stronger justification.3 1 7
Mining, however, is subject to many additional regulations that
serve to limit development expectations; many of these regulations were
in place long before FLPMA's enactment. 318 The trend over the past
sixty-five years has been toward increased regulation and decreased ex-
pectations of free development. 319 Statutes that require permits before
mining may begin are but one example of the extensive regulation of min-
ing. 320 Therefore, a mineral owner had only limited development expec-
tations even before FLPMA.
315. Cf Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 710-11 (no compensation required if leases
acquired after preservation intent clear); Michelman, supra note 272, at 1238 (no compensa-
tion required if land acquired with knowledge that a scenic easement was soon to be enforced).
But see Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 569, 586-87 (1984) (purchaser not injured if regulatory risk lowered purchase price, but
seller injured by lower price); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2
(1987) (buyers' knowledge of impending restriction immaterial where restriction could not
constitutionally be imposed without compensation).
316. A directly analogous situation is the judicial refusal to require compensation for value
traceable to the purpose for which the government acquires the property. For example, the
government need not acquire undeveloped land for dam construction at the price homesites
will command after completion of the dam. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943)
("[O]wners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the Govern-
ment's activities.").
317. For example, rights acquired before and after enactment of FLPMA are subject to
different management standards in WSA's. See supra text accompanying notes 78-95.
318. Pre-FLPMA regulation of mining claims by the BLM and the Forest Service is dis-
cussed in supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text. Mineral development on private lands
was also subject to state regulation prior to the enactment of FLPMA. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. tit. 34, §§ 32-101, 32-126 (1990) (reenacting Colorado Open Mining Land Reclamation
Act of 1973).
319. States as well as the federal government may regulate mining on the public lands in
order to protect the environment. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572,
584-89 (1987). Development of wetlands is another area in which anticipation of unlimited
development rights might not be reasonable, given the regulatory climate. Crow-New Jersey
32 Ltd. v. Township of Clinton, 718 F. Supp. 278, 384 (D.N.J. 1989). See generally Blumm &
Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, In-
tergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 754-60 (1989).
320. See, for example, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988), which provides permitting standards to bolster those that existed
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Overall, statutes and regulations have transformed mining into a
regulated industry.32' In fact, a recent case classified an unpatented min-
ing claim, which was traditionally considered a form of property, as a
mere right to a stream of income, thus placing its regulation into the less
critical realm of economic matters.3 22 Any "reasonable" expectation
about mining development must consider these omnipresent rules.
The popular conception, nevertheless, is that miners have no com-
punction about destroying the surface value of land. Correct or not, the
mining industry's image may help protect the BLM against takings chal-
lenges brought by mining interests.3 23 The popular view of miners as
ruthless exploiters of land appears to have contributed to judicial and
legislative willingness to protect surface owners at the expense of owners
of mineral rights.3 24 For example, some state statutes require payment
for damages to the surface estate caused by oil and gas operations, even if
the harm to the surface falls within the implied or express easement of
use purchased with the mineral estate.3 25 Challenges to these statutes
alleging unconstitutional takings have been unsuccessful. 326
Mining, moreover, can cause pollution and subsidence, problems
similar to those addressed by nuisance law.3 27 It is a basic tenet of law
previously in the various states.
321. Those doing business in a regulated field cannot object to statutory amendments ad-
ded to buttress the original legislative end. Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 758
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 46 (1990) (upholding Uniform Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (1988)).
322. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985).
323. Cf Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753
(1988):
Takings doctrine is generated not by any abstract methodological or theoretical con-
cern, but by the pictures that judges have in their heads about the participants in the
public land use planning arena, pictures about who is empowered, who is
unempowered and how those who enjoy a power monopoly have used the power to
their strategic advantage.
324. For an overview of the development of judicial and legislative views on the rights of
mineral owners and surface owners, see supra text accompanying notes 152 - 213. See also
Dycus, supra note 145, at 915-16 (mineral owner may have no reasonable expectation to de-
stroy or substantially interfere with surface owner's rights).
325. Eg., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1980 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, § 318.2-.9 (1969 & Supp. 1990).
326. Some courts have declared these statutes to be mere rearrangements of tort liability.
Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 558 (8th Cir. 1984); Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766
P.2d 1347, 1349-52 (Okla. 1986). They have also been described as minor rearrangements of
the bundle of rights. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 558 ("Amoco's right to not compensate Murphy for
unavoidable damage to Murphy's surface estate, if indeed it is 'property' at all, amounts to a
minor strand in the full bundle of rights which constitutes Amoco's mineral estate."); see
Lowe, Development in Non-Regulatory Oil and Gas Law: Issues of the Eighties, 35 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 21-39 (1984) (discussion of the constitutionality of surface damage
acts passed by several states).
327. Keystone suggests that the subsidence created by mining would be a nuisance. Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Co. v. de Benedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491-93 (1987). But see Florida
Rock Indus., Inc., v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 167 (1990) (extensive limestone mining in
area "never has been considered a nuisance").
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that no person may unreasonably use private property to the detriment of
any neighbor: "all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the commu-
nity. ' 328 Generally, nuisance law looks to the reasonableness of a spe-
cific use in a specific location. 329 Naturally, this requires balancing the
benefits of an activity against the degree of harm it causes. 330 Regulation
of mining could balance harms to the public and the private owner in
much the same manner as traditional nuisance doctrine. 3
Both the history of regulation and the types of problems caused by
mining lead to the conclusion that the BLM could regulate mining more
strictly than other activities on the public lands. The almost all-encom-
passing requirements of varied environmental laws already restrain the
expectation of development. The public views mining as an activity that
must be restricted to protect other values. The benefits and adverse im-
pacts of mining can be compared in a manner similar to traditional nui-
sance analysis. Should this balancing lead to the conclusion that mining
must be precluded, compensation would not be required.
Other private property rights are not subject to the same regulatory
climate and public perception as mineral rights. Therefore, courts would
probably undertake a more searching review of the government interest
to be protected and the harm to be avoided when the BLM regulates the
exercise of other property rights. The burden of proof imposed on the
government could vary based on the strength of the private party's rea-
sonable expectations of development and the strength of public expecta-
tions that the land would either be protected or put to a different use.
332
Severe impacts on major public resources, such as important wildlife
habitat, heavily used recreational areas, or ecologically unique lands,
328. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
329. As Justice Sutherland's famous aphorism provides, "A nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
330. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 comment a (1979); id. § 827 (factors
relevant to gravity of harm are the extent and character of the harm, the social value of the
plaintiff's use, its suitability to the locality in question, and the burden on the plaintiff of
avoiding the harm); id. § 828 (factors relevant to the utility of the actor's conduct are its social
value, its suitability to the locality in question, and the impracticality of the defendant prevent-
ing the harm). Generally, the remedy for a nuisance is to enjoin it, but some cases have
awarded damages and allowed the activity to continue. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 228, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1970).
331. See Laitos, supra note 298, at 1-34 to 1-43; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(1970) (arguing that regulatory objectives similar to the prevention of nuisance enjoy greater
judicial acceptance than others).
332. Such considerations could include, among others, financial expenditures, length of
time held without development, and conformity with other uses of similar property.
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should justify greater restrictions than impacts that are either less severe
or affect less important resources. 333
CONCLUSION
Congress has directed the BLM to take any action needed to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands under its manage-
ment. Although the command clearly calls for action, when examined
closely it "breath[es] discretion at every pore. ' 334 A court may invali-
date a BLM decision for arbitrariness or compel the agency to consider
whether an activity will cause improper degradation. 335 Nonetheless, the
BLM's interpretation of both the extent of its power and the impacts of
the proposed action will receive deference from the courts. 336 In many
cases, therefore, the agency's interpretation will determine whether pri-
vate or collective property interests prevail.
Currently, the agency uses its regulatory powers under FLPMA to
accommodate private interests and collective values, but ultimately sub-
ordinates the collective values to private property interests. The BLM
protects collective values only when doing so will not unreasonably bur-
den a private party's exercise of its rights. This "weak" interpretation of
the statute reflects the judicial doctrine of accommodation, a familiar
tenet from oil and gas law. Because it is not patently unreasonable, this
interpretation is entitled to judicial deference. 337
The current "weak" interpretation is not, however, the only accept-
able reading of the duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation. 338
Under a "strong" interpretation, the BLM would not focus primarily on
fulfilling private objectives. Instead, the BLM would balance the gains
from a private endeavor against the costs to other public land values to
333. Placing a restrictive covenant on private rights to protect public lands will increase
the value of the public lands, arguably making the decision an eminent domain taking. See
Stoebuck, supra note 304, at 1091-93. However, because the BLM is acting for the public,
compensation should not be automatic. See Sax, supra note 237, at 177-78. Compensation
perhaps should be given to a private party denied the opportunity to act if the restriction
enables another activity, which provides the government with revenue, to proceed. Cf. Van
Alstyne, supra note 331, at 20, 23-26 (invalidate zoning that primarily aids adjacent private
property and that is designed to lower cost of future government acquisitions).
334. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1074 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Brief of Federal
Defendants).
335. Id. at 1088.
336. See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1008-09 (D. Utah 1979).
337. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984). For application of this doctrine to the Department of the Interior, see Udall v. Tall-
man, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965); Colorado v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 486 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Nevertheless, the courts are the final authority on statutory interpretation. Webb v.
Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1989); Oregon v. BLM, 876 F.2d 1419, 1425 (9th Cir.
1989).
338. An agency may revise its statutory interpretation by issuing new regulations. See,
e.g., Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1989).
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determine if the sacrifice were "undue." Such a flexible correlative rights
doctrine would protect both public and private rights.
Under the strong interpretation, preservation of some public land
attributes could override other concerns. The BLM, as an agency en-
trusted with the public interest, must not yield important collective val-
ues without fully considering the alternatives. 339  A "strong"
interpretation would allow the BLM to make explicit choices between
the environmental and commodity values served by the public lands.
34°
No "crystalline" rules can be established to govern allocation deci-
sions; the guidelines must vary in response to the varying situations they
govern.34 1 Proposals for activities that are likely to impinge on lands
uniquely suited to meeting collective needs should be scrutinized with
special care. The government's burden of proof on the validity of a deci-
sion should also vary with the character of the interest protected by the
regulation. Because the BLM protects diffuse collective interests when it
acts to protect its holdings, any decision forbidding private activity might
withstand a takings challenge.
In sum, the line between "private" and "public" property is no
longer clearly drawn. Although the blurring of this boundary can be
seen in public land law, it is also occurring in other contexts. Private
expectations of gaining advantage through control of property must
change if the land, water, and air of the Earth are to continue to supply
our needs. Governmental powers should be used to protect collective
values wherever possible. Private property rights should not include the
ability to unnecessarily or unduly degrade the environment upon which
all rely.
339. In other words, a property rule protects public land that satisfies distinct collective
values. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (property rules apply when an
entitlement may not be transferred other than by voluntary sale).
340. The collective values served by the public lands need not be preserved at any cost. In
other words, they need not be protected by a rule of inalienability. See id. at 1092-93. Con-
gress has invoked a rule of complete protection in some instances, such as the Endangered
Species Act. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978). However, Con-
gress has not required such absolute protection under FLPMA, and in fact it would be incon-
sistent with the BLM's allocative function.
341. See Merrill, supra note 297, at 19-20; see also Rose, Crystals and Mud and Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (property law varies between hard rules, so-called crystal,
and discretionary standards, so-called mud, and each form of law has its own strengths). But
see Radin, The Liberal Concepiion of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) (bright lines or clear rules preferable because they help avoid
arbitrary action).
(Vol. 18:43
